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1. Introduction 
How does collective action succeed in rural communities? This thesis investigates a forest 
planting project in the rural south of Malawi. Small scale farmers were ordered to abstain 
from cultivating their gardens on a mountain, as the whole mountainside land was 
designated to forest planting. The forest project hence turned into a conflict over land. It can 
be considered a collective action problem, because each individual farmer would be better 
off with continued cultivation on his own garden, while the community as a whole suffered 
from severe soil erosion due to the deforested mountain. In the long term, everybody would 
be better off with a forested mountain. The results of this collective action problem differed 
in the villages surrounding the mountain. In some villages, farmers were convinced to 
cooperate in the forest project, and the communities were rewarded with a valuable forest 
resource benefiting all inhabitants. Other villages failed, and today suffer from increasing 
problems of soil erosion. The main question of this thesis is why and how some villages 
reached the collectively successful results, while others did not. What were the differences 
between these villages and how may these differences have resulted in completely different 
outcomes in the forest project? 
I analyse the decision faced by individual farmers of whether to contribute their land to the 
forest project or not. It is assumed that specific circumstances within the villages have 
affected the individual decisions and thus determined the success or failure of the forest 
project. 
The empirical analysis is based on qualitative data collected during two months of fieldwork 
in the villages in 2007, with a focus on interviews and observations. The fieldwork revealed 
two main factors behind successful collective action; (1) a social norm supporting general 
co-operative behaviour, and (2) formal punishment of defectors, in a case in which the social 
norm was not strong enough to convince farmers of co-operation. Both regulations increase 
farmers’ incentives to co-operate, and thus contribute to preserve the common pool resource. 
A shared norm can support collective action by imposing loss of reputation for those 
breaking it and thus expectations about mutual co-operation. Norms develop continuously in 
a community and depend on legitimacy among inhabitants. Only one of the research villages 
had a strong norm supporting co-operational behaviour. Through the forest project and other 
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village projects, they experienced that co-operative behaviour was beneficial, both because 
they became convinced that everybody else would co-operate and because the beneficial 
outcome of village projects was actually distributed fairly in the end. Previous successful 
experiences with collective action seem to have developed the social norm of co-operative 
behaviour in this village. 
In other villages, there was little cooperation on village level and village resources were to a 
greater extent captured by a village elite. Villagers had less respect for their leaders and 
hence did not co-operate in the projects they introduced. Only one of these non-co-operative 
villages was able to preserve the planted forest, using strict regulation; the forest managers 
enforced hard punishments on non-co-operating farmers. This method had substantial 
drawbacks compared to the social norm method. As the punishments were not considered 
fair and legitimate among farmers, it actually increased the already high level of conflicts 
and anger towards the village leader. The strict enforcement of rules was crucial in order to 
preserve the forest, but it probably also gave negative external effects on social capital in the 
village.  
There is a large literature on collective action on common pool resources. Standard 
economic theory proposes a result in which nobody co-operates, because everybody gains 
individually from defecting, given the choice of others. Hardin (1968) introduced this 
depressive result as the tragedy of the commons. His proposal is, however, not applicable in 
general, because it leans on the assumption that an individual’s choices are independent of 
his expectation about others’ choices (Runge, 1981). Common pool resources can be, and 
often are, regulated by local communities with reasonable degrees of success (Ostrom, 
1990). It is these regulations which induce expectations among individuals about the 
behaviour of others. If individuals expect that everybody else will co-operate, they might 
benefit from choosing co-operation, because they know that non-co-operative behaviour 
may spread. Hence, in the long run, the individual might be best off choosing behaviour 
depending on the behaviour of others. The role of leadership becomes important as the 
leader will have the possibility to convince individuals to co-operate by inducing 
expectations about co-operation (Baland & Platteau, 1996). Leaders may also use and 
develop further the level of trust and trustworthiness in the community, which in itself 
supports co-operation (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004). 
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1.1.1 Method 
The thesis is based on qualitative data collected during a two months stay in the villages in 
the summer of 2007. Information is obtained through interviews, mainly with only one 
respondent at the time, but also in small groups. I have tried to speak with as many people as 
possible, and to choose respondents with alternative views. Interviews were mainly done in 
six villages, from which all leaders and several villagers are interviewed. Four of these 
villages were in my main focus, because they represented the villages with the most distinct 
results in the forest project. This was villages 1 and 9, with a fully forested mountainside, 
and villages 4 and 5, with a bare and cultivated mountainside. At least five mountainside 
farmers from each of these four villages were interviewed, in order to get the story as 
detailed and right as possible. A list of all respondents is found in the appendix. Qualitative 
data collected by research assistants from the Malawi Land Tenure and Social Capital 
research project is used in addition to my own.  
The main language spoken in the area is Chichewa, and very few speak English in addition, 
hence nearly all interviews were done through a translator. This made it more difficult to 
obtain confidential information from respondents. In addition to language barriers, it was 
problematic to get accurate information about the forest project because of two things; 
people did not remember in detail what happened in the past, up to seven years earlier, and; 
people in the villages which lost the forest seemed to be unwilling to tell why the forest was 
gone, and mountainside farmers seemed to be unwilling to admit that they disobeyed orders 
to stop cultivate. Village gossiping and personal incentives might also have affected their 
presentation of the story to me. By speaking with as many different people as possible, and 
by living in the villages and observing village life and behaviour, I have done my best to 
obtain an objective picture of the story. 
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2. Background 
2.1 Land scarcity and deforestation 
The analysed forest case is taken from Chiradzulu district in the south of Malawi. 
Chiradzulu district is one of the most populated districts of Malawi, with a population 
density of 329 inhabitants per square kilometre, of whom 90 % earn their living by farming1. 
An HIV rate estimated between 10 and 25 % contribute to make this district one of the 
poorest in the country, where totally 65 % of the population live under the national poverty 
line2. High population growth, few income alternatives to subsistence farming and limited 
access to modern agricultural technologies have resulted in increased and heavy demand for 
land. Limited private property rights over customary land, in line with African traditional 
laws, has made it possible for farmers to clear new land in originally forested areas. Today 
all available land, from roadsides to mountain summits, is cultivated. This trend has 
decreased forested areas to unsustainable levels, which creates two urgent problems; 
increased soil erosion on all surrounding land and severe lack of firewood. The latter is of 
immediate concern when the forest disappears, as rural households depend on firewood for 
daily cooking, warming and lightning, and timber for house building. The former is just as 
serious, but of a more long-term concern. Hence it is not so obviously seen as an effect of 
deforestation, although it is directly related to it. 
Only few generations ago, the area was almost covered with forest. During the regime of 
Banda (1963-1994), all mountains were governmental lands, and hence not allowed for 
cultivation, including the mountain discussed in this thesis. However, no controls or 
punishments were enforced on those clearing governmental land during Banda and farmers 
who needed land established new gardens in the mountainside. These farmers had been 
cultivating their mountainside gardens for many years when a new land law transferred 
mountain land from governmental to customary land, which meant the management rights 
                                              
1 Estimates from Médecines Sans Frontières Malawi, 2004. 
2 Data from Human Development Report 2007/2008. 
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were given to village leaders. According to customary law, nobody has private ownership 
over land as in western terms, but the user holds user rights as long as he cultivates it. Thus, 
the mountainside farmers claimed the land as theirs, because they had used it for several 
years, and hence they were not thrown out of their gardens. However, customary law assigns 
village leaders the rights to allocate new land. The fact that the mountainside land was never 
allocated to its users initially, was used against these farmers when the land was designated 
for the forest project. They were not considered as rightful holders of the land, compared to 
holders of land in the valley, and hence they were not given any compensation when it was 
decided that the area should be replanted with forest.  
“ People who cultivate up mountain are already told to stop, they are just continuing on 
their own will, so they have nothing to say. They will find their own ways to survive (if forest 
is planted again), maybe go somewhere else to seek for land, it is up to them. … They went 
up there without permission in the first place.” (Leader village 5. His village is now 
deforested again after the tree planting project.) 
2.2 Soil erosion 
It is especially gully erosion which causes problems on deforested mountains. During rain 
seasons, heavy rains gather in fast-running streams of water in the mountainside, which 
again gather in more forceful rivers the further down the mountain they come. These 
powerful rivers take with them riverbank soil on their way down, decreasing the amount of 
soil in mountainside and in the land underneath it every year, and dig deep gullies. Hence, 
every year there is less soil to cultivate on, especially in the mountainside, and the harvests 
decrease similarly. The yields from the mountainside gardens have decreased severely only 
in few years. Some areas are just left with bare stones and are not usable for cultivation any 
longer. But the problem does not only affect the mountainside, it harshly damages the 
gardens in the valley underneath the mountain too. One year, 10-15 years ago, it rained so 
much that the streams flooded, creating new gullies in the valley which washed away large 
parts of people’s gardens. This event, in addition to the annual depletion of the soil during 
rain seasons, was an eye-opener for the people in the villages regarding the problems with 
soil erosion. A forest would prevent water from gathering in rivers and would spread the 
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water more evenly all over the mountainside. People in the villages also recognise the 
preventative effect of forest on soil erosion. 
 8 
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3. The conflict 
3.1 The forest project 
Due to increasing problems of soil erosion, a well-known Member of Parliament from the 
area, Patrick Mbewe, initiated a forest planting project in 2000. He convinced MASAF3 to 
finance it and together with the District Forest Ministry they organized public meetings 
where the project implementation was discussed and decided on.  
“The whole mountainside was cultivated, except some stony areas with almost no soil. Then 
MASAF initiated the tree planting, came here and said: “Look, there are no trees in the 
mountain, we want to plant trees.”” (Chief Village 9) 
As this chief confirms, neither villagers nor their leaders were actually given a choice of 
whether to receive the project or not. They were forced to welcome it, as it was meant to 
benefit their communities. Governmental officers from the District Forest Ministry operated 
the project in the implementation phase, in co-operation with village leaders and local forest 
committees. Nursery beds were made for the tree seedlings in July 2000. In November and 
December, 89.000 seedlings were planted on a 50 hectare area covering the mountainside. 
The seedlings were all exotic tree species, dominated by blue gum, a fast-growing resistant 
eucalyptus specie. Weeding was done in January and February 2001, and after this the 
governmental officers withdrew from the project. Management was left to the local 
communities, represented by village leaders and forest committees. In March 2001, rules 
regarding use of the forest were decided for at a public meeting. When the forest matured, 
the surplus of trees was to be used for development of the villages and otherwise to help 
poor people and especially orphans in the villages. 
There are nine villages surrounding the mountain, all controlling their separate parts of the 
mountainside. The mountainside land belonging to one village was mostly cultivated by 
                                              
3 MASAF (Malawi Social Action Fund) is an organisation financing community development projects, with 
credit from the World Bank. 
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inhabitants of the same village, though there were also a few mountainside farmers coming 
from other villages. In some villages, around 50 % of the inhabitants held pieces of their 
land in the mountainside, while in other villages the share was much lower. The loss of user 
rights to the mountainside land was a severe blow for the affected farmers. Their opinion 
was not heard when the forest project was introduced, and after governmental officers had 
withdrawn from the management, many of them started to sabotage the project. The 
sabotage was done by up-rooting or in other ways destroying the planted tree seedlings, in 
order to take back their gardens for cultivation.  
The rest of this chapter analyses the situation faced by representative mountainside farmers 
at the time when the communities took over the forest management in spring 2001. It is 
assumed that the farmers at that time had a choice of whether to co-operate or defect in the 
project. Co-operation refers to a choice of giving up their land to forest planting, while 
defection refers to choosing continued cultivation. Chapter 3.2 discusses the individual’s 
utility from the two alternatives, and chapter 3.3 models the utility formally.   
3.2 A collective action problem on a common pool 
resource 
3.2.1 The forest as a common pool resource 
The forest considered in this thesis is defined to be a common pool resource. Ostrom (1990) 
defines a common pool resource to be “a resource system that is sufficiently large as to make 
it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from 
its use”. The analysed forest has the property of being limitedly excludable. The forest 
managers have the possibility to prevent everyone to cut trees, but to the cost of hiring 
guards. The more guards they hire, the more difficult it will be to steal trees. In addition to 
limited excludability, the forest has the property of being rivalrous. Rivalry refers to a good 
being consumed at the expense of other agents’ consumption of the same good. When one 
villager cuts and removes a tree, the same tree cannot be logged again by others, hence the 
forest is a rivalrous resource. In comparison are pure public goods defined to be both non-
rivalrous and non-excludable, whereas open-access resources are non-excludable but 
rivalrous (Perman et al, 2003). The forest as a common pool resource is both rivalrous and 
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limitedly excludable. In addition it also creates a positive externality of preventing soil 
erosion on lower located land areas, which in this case is its main intention. The challenge 
when managing this common pool resource is to preserve the forest as large and thick as 
possible, in order to obtain as little soil erosion as possible. Logging of trees for timber must 
therefore be regulated. 
3.2.2 The forest project as a collective action problem 
Regulating common pool resources often turn into collective action problems, in which 
agents have to co-operate to reach the best sustainable outcome. The forest project depended 
on collective action by the mountainside farmers, because each had to sacrifice their 
individual benefits of cultivating their gardens, in order to obtain greater gains for the whole 
community in terms of decreased soil erosion and timber. This is also called a social 
dilemma. Elster (1985) defines a collective action problem as “a conflict in which; (1) each 
individual derives greater benefits under universal co-operation than under universal non-co-
operation, and (2) each derives more benefits if he abstains from co-operation, regardless of 
what others do”. An illustration of the benefits of collective action is given in figure 3-1. The 
line C(j) gives the net individual benefits for each co-operating agent, depending on how 
many others who co-operate. ~C(j-1) gives the net individual benefit for each defecting 
agent, also depending on the share of co-operators. Everyone’s payoff increase with the 
amount of co-operators, but the benefit to defectors is higher than that to co-operators in all 
cases. If everybody acts individually, meaning nobody co-operates, all agents will receive x 
benefits. In figure 3-1, if more than only one agent co-operate, they all receive higher than x 
benefits. The highest possible payoff by co-operating, G, is reached when everybody co-
operates. Incentives for free-riding occur as each individual is best off when everybody co-
operates except himself. The Nash equilibrium proposed by standard economic theory is 
therefore one of zero co-operation, whilst the full co-operation solution gives largest net 
benefits.  
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Figure 3-1: The payoff structure of a standard collective action problem. N players 
choose between co-operating (C) or defecting (~C). When j individuals co-operate, 
their payoffs are always lower than the j-1 individuals who do not co-operate. The 
predicted outcome is that no one will co-operate and all players will receive X 
benefits. The temptation (T) to defect is the increase in benefit any co-operator 
would receive by switching to defecting. If all co-operate, they all receive G-X more 
benefits than if all defect. (The figure is copied from Ostrom, 1998, figure 1) 
Individual gains from full co-operation 
According to Elster’s definition of a collective action problem, each individual should derive 
greater benefits under universal co-operation than under universal non-co-operation. Was 
this the case for mountainside farmers in the forest project? The mountainside farmers faced 
a choice of whether to stop cultivating at once and give their lands up to village control (co-
operating), or to resist the tree planting by continued cultivation, which implied damaging 
the trees in their garden (defecting). Co-operation in the project implied loosing their 
mountainside gardens, which they depended on for their annual harvest. But if everybody 
co-operated, they all received benefits of decreased soil erosion and access to timber. Nearly 
all mountainside farmers had access to land in the valley, in addition to their mountainside 
land, hence they would also benefit from reduced erosion on these plots. This section 
analyses the situation faced by mountainside farmers and whether the forest project would 
actually benefit them individually if everybody co-operated.  
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According to most mountainside farmers, they did not want the project in advance, because 
they depended too much on their gardens. Afterwards, however, some of them who lived in 
villages where the forest did mature were happy about it, because they saw how the forest 
decreased erosion problems and that it benefited the community, including themselves, with 
timber. I now analyse the variables affecting their individual gains and losses of full co-
operation versus full defection from my own outside point of view. 
Benefits from status quo 
By co-operating, the farmers lost the ability to cultivate their gardens in the mountainside 
and hence lost a part of their annual harvest. All villagers live mainly from farming and 
consume their harvest in the household. Annual harvests rarely exceed household 
consumption needs. It is more often the other way around; harvests are too small to cover the 
consumption needs of the household. Generally, this relation depends on weather conditions 
and how much fertilizer the farmer could afford to apply in his gardens. Around year 2000, 
fertilizer was too expensive for most of these farmers, and hence few could expect that their 
harvests would be sufficient for household needs. Income sources outside farming are and 
were very limited, hence the farmers were very dependent on their annual harvest, and thus 
every piece of land they had, to feed their families. The land was important also in regards of 
securing next generation, even to the few who had enough available land other places. 
According to matrilineal custom in the area, land is held by females, and daughters inherit 
their mothers’ land. In 2000-2005, the average Malawian woman had six children (UN 
Population Division, 2006). The land belonging to one household must therefore, on 
average, be split in three pieces and feed three households in the next generation. The next 
generation will thus face even more severe problems of land scarcity than the present 
generation. With this pessimistic preview of the future, farmers are keen on keeping their 
land in family hands.  
By giving up their land they would loose the possibility to grow crops on the plot, but save a 
lot of hard work too. Mountainside cultivation gave little output per labour effort, compared 
to the more fertile plots in the valley. Those who had several other plots could use the freed 
labour to intensify cultivation other places, and gain benefit from it. Lack of capital would 
normally prevent them from hiring in this labour otherwise. For most, however, the freed 
labour would have little alternative use. They were already utilising all their plots to their 
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full extent, given capital constraint. Employment is nearly impossible to find for these 
farmers and only occasional, low-profit jobs might be possible to get. Hence, the freed 
labour would not be valued highly. Though the mountainside land was relatively 
unproductive, the farmers needed it to feed their families.  
Benefits from the forest project 
A forest would yield a considerable effect of preventing soil erosion in the valley, where 
nearly all mountainside farmers had additional gardens. These gardens have been damaged 
by strong gully erosion the past decade, mainly because of the deforestation in the 
mountainside. A forest would prevent future erosion on these plots. In addition, a forest 
would bring a source of timber to the communities. The sustainable outtake of timber per 
year would be limited, but would suffice for some development work in the village and some 
poles to people building houses. One mature blue gum tree has an economic value of around 
500 MKW4 in the villages. An approximation of a possible outtake is around 50 such trees a 
year. If the value would be equally shared within the village, each household would be left 
with 200-500 MKW per year, depending on the number of households in each village. This 
is not much. Nevertheless, people could be given four or five trees at a time, when they 
needed them for house building, which happens only occasional years. This is important, 
because few are able to buy the same amount of timber at the market at the same time. The 
forest hence works as a saving source, which can be withdrawn upon in times of need. In 
addition to prevented soil erosion and access to timber, the forest project would imply a 
source of grass in the mountainside. If cultivation was stopped, grass would grow besides the 
trees, which could be used for roofs on houses. Grass is not very difficult to get hold of in 
the villages anyway, but the mountainside would become the nearest source and make grass 
fetching easier. In some villages, the previous garden holders held full rights over the grass 
in their old gardens. Meanwhile in other villages, the previous borders were wiped out after 
tree planting and initial land holders held no particular rights to the grass on their previous 
gardens. The forested land was totally transferred to a common resource, with no individual 
priority. These different results are discussed in chapter 4.1.  
                                              
4 500 MKW (Malawian Kwacha) correspond to ca US$ 3.5. 
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The problem with the mountainside land if cultivated is that its productivity decreases 
continuously every year, due to soil erosion. A fertile plot at one point of time would be 
completely unproductive some time in the future, if no forest was planted to protect the soil. 
The benefits of the status quo situation would hence erode with time, turning out to nothing 
in the end. Meanwhile, the benefits of a forest would increase in time. If everybody 
contributed, it would take some years before the forest would mature and the benefits in 
terms of prevented soil erosion in the valley and access to timber would occur. This time lag 
is illustrated in figure 3-2. 
 
Figure 3-2: How benefits of defection and benefits of full co-operation possibly 
move with time 
It is difficult to estimate exactly how these curves move in time, but it will not take many 
years with continued cultivation in the mountainside before all fertile soil will be gone and 
the area will be useless for food production. However, the present value of the project at the 
time of project start depends on the individual discount factor. Some of these farmers are 
known to have very low discount factors due to poverty, and especially so by the time of 
project start in 20015, meaning that they value future benefits relatively little compared to 
present benefits. Still, individual discount factors are empirically found to increase over time 
(Laibson, 1998). People generally discount values more from the first period to the second, 
                                              
5 Poverty was more severe in rural Malawi in 2001 than it is at the moment of writing, in 2008. President 
Mutharika, who came to power in 2004, managed to improve Malawian economy. Most importantly for rural 
inhabitants, the government in 2004 introduced fertilizer subsidies, giving a positive shift in agricultural 
production and lifting many small-scale farmers above the limit to self-subsistence.  
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than they do from the second period to the third, and so on. If the mountainside farmers 
follow this pattern, a very low initial discount factor does not necessarily imply a negative 
present individual value of the forest. I hence argue that the representative mountainside 
farmer would be better off with universal co-operation than universal non-co-operation. At 
the same time, the individual mountainside farmer would always be better off by defecting 
himself, given the choice of others. The marginal effect of his individual contribution to 
forested land is close to zero, no matter the size of the total forested area. This is because of 
the small area of each mountainside plot, on average around 0.2 hectare, from which the 
effect of forest would hardly be noticeable. 
3.2.3 A collective action problem on maintaining the forest 
The villages which succeeded to turn the cultivated gardens into forested land, then later 
faced a second problem of collective action; namely to preserve their forest from loggers. 
The trees are valuable resources if cut down, needed urgently in all households and highly 
valued at the market. Each individual therefore marginally benefits from cutting a tree and 
pocketing the sales-sum, compared to leaving the tree for erosion prevention. This is due to 
the low marginal effect of a tree on soil erosion. However, the total benefits from the 
standing forest in terms of prevented soil erosion on all villagers land, exceed the benefits 
from cutting all trees and selling them at the market. Individual incentives hence deviate 
from common interests. This second collective action problem might be just as hard to solve 
as the first one.  
3.3 Modelling the individual decision 
This section develops a model which I believe usefully illustrates important factors behind 
different results of the analysed forest project. The choice faced by farmers of whether to co-
operate or not in this collective action problem is approached through modelling their 
individual utility. I model the effect of a social norm on personal utility, with inspiration 
from Nyborg’s and Rege’s (2003) model on smoking behaviour. I use a tipping model 
similar to the one developed by Andvig and Moene (1990) on corruption to show that there 
are only two likely outcomes; either one in which a high share of mountainside farmers co-
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operates or one in which everybody defects. These two outcomes are likely because the net 
utility of co-operation increases with the share of co-operators, through increased reputation 
loss if defecting. I have not included in this model that the probability of obtaining formal 
punishment if defecting also increases with the share of co-operators (Kleiman, 1999). 
However, this fact would only strengthen the predictions of the model. 
There are two types of people in each village; mountainside farmers and valley farmers. 
Mountainside farmers are the ones who initially have at least one garden in the 
mountainside, in addition to others in the valley. Valley farmers only have gardens in the 
valley. Only mountainside farmers are decision makers. They have to decide whether to 
contribute their land to the forest project, referred to as co-operating, or continue cultivating, 
referred to as defecting. In this simple setup, each mountainside farmer has an initial land 
holding of two area units, one in the mountainside and one in the valley underneath. The 
variable gi refers to the area land contribution to the forest from mountainside farmer i. gi 
can only take values 1 or 0, meaning farmer i either co-operates by giving his/her6 whole 
garden, choosing gi=1, or defects by contributing nothing, choosing gi=0. There is no 
middle way of scaled co-operation possible. The total forested area is the sum of all 
contributions, G = ∑jgj.  
Benefits of continued cultivation 
The mountainside farmers want to use their gardens for cultivation. If they co-operate in the 
forest project, they have to stop cultivating, which imposes a cost to each of them. This cost 
differs between mountainside farmers, because they depend on their mountainside gardens to 
different degrees, according to the size of their household and other possible sources of 
income. The cost of stopping cultivation for mountainside farmer i is referred to as yi.  
                                              
6 The gender of the mountainside farmers is not specified, as there are both male and female mountainside 
farmers. In most cases, the mountainside farmer represents a household, in which the husband and wife work 
together in all their gardens and the harvest is shared within the household. Females are normally the formal 
holders of land, due to matrilineal land inheritance in the area. However, men usually make household 
decisions, also concerning land affairs, through their role as household heads. The representative mountainside 
farmer is thus referred to as a male. Still, note that single mothers make up a large share of the households, in 
which case the women are the key decision makers. 
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Benefits of forest 
All villagers obtain benefits from the forest, no matter their individual contribution to it. The 
larger the forested area, the greater are the beneficial effects. The forest creates benefits to 
villagers mainly in two ways; it prevents soil erosion in the valley and it gives a source of 
valuable timber. Each mountainside farmer has one area unit of arable land in the valley, 
which is exposed to soil erosion due to the deforested mountain. Trees in the mountainside 
prevent soil erosion in the valley, with a positive effect determined as v(G) in every garden. 
The positive effect of prevented soil erosion increases with the forested area, v’(G)>0. In 
addition to preventing soil erosion, the forest also gives benefits in terms of timber, valuable 
for use in house building and for firewood. Each villager will receive a share β of the forest 
in terms of timber, independent of his own contribution. The total benefits of forest to each 
farmer is thus: v(G)+βG.  
Expected penalty by defecting 
Defecting mountainside farmers risk some kind of formal punishment from the leaders if 
they are caught. Each farmer faces a probability q of receiving a penalty P if he chooses to 
defect. Their expected penalty is thus qP. It is likely that everybody in the village will know 
if somebody defects and who that is, because the village is small and everybody sees 
whether people cultivate their gardens or not. Hence, the leaders will also know which 
farmers defect. The probability q of receiving a penalty if defecting can be considered as the 
probability that the leaders will indeed be strong enough impose the penalty on the ones they 
know defect.  
Social disapproval by defecting 
Individuals care about their reputation in the village. By defecting in the forest project, the 
mountainside farmers obtain some loss of reputation, or social disapproval, from the 
villagers who thought they ought to have co-operated. These people are the ones in the 
village who agree upon and follow a norm7, saying that one should co-operate in common 
                                              
7Ostrom (2005) distinguishes a norm from a rule by defining a norm as not including an “or else”-element. 
That is, the norm implies no commonly known formal sanctions imposed on defectors, though it might imply 
more informal social sanctions, like loss of reputation. Norms can help reaching a co-operative outcome in 
collective action games, because they give people a reason to believe that others will co-operate in fear of 
social sanctions. When people believe that everybody else will co-operate, they do not suspect that they will 
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village projects organised by the leader8. The norm believers in the village will impose 
social disapproval9 on defecting mountainside farmers. The share of norm believers in the 
village is determined as n. Hence, each defecting mountainside farmer receives social 
disapproval nd, where d is determined as the amount of social disapproval given by each 
norm believer in the group. The social disapproval can be considered as the feeling of guilt 
or shame for the norm breaker. This feeling will depend on how many other norm breakers 
there are in the group. If I am the only one breaking the norm, I am likely to feel more 
ashamed than if there are several others who do the same around me. The amount of social 
disapproval imposed by each norm believer, d, thus depends on the share of norm breakers 
in the village. The share of norm breakers in the forest project is determined as the share of 
defecting mountainside farmers, 1-x, where x is the share of co-operating mountainside 
farmers. The total reputation loss for a defecting mountainside farmer is thus: 
x
nd
−1 . Note 
that this is a very simplified expression for reputation loss. The relationship between a norm 
and the share of people following it in a specific situation is in practice correlated. In 
collective action problems, people tend to co-operate if others co-operate, and defect if 
others defect. In game theoretical terms this is referred to as a tit-for-tat strategy.  If 
decisions are made simultaneously, like in the forest project, they have to base their 
decisions on expectations about what others will do. Expectations will partly depend on their 
experiences with similar collective action problems. Individuals who have experienced 
previously that others co-operate, might expect that they co-operate this time too, and hence 
choose co-operation themselves. With time, people don’t even consider their net utility of 
the different strategies, and hence the co-operation behaviour evolves into a habit, or a norm 
                                                                                                                                           
end up as suckers if they co-operate too, and hence they co-operate. Such mutual expectations about co-
operation from others in turn make everybody co-operate. 
8 The co-operation norm can be considered as a norm of reciprocity for convenience. A reciprocity norm 
implies that one should co-operate if others do. However, I do not call it a reciprocity norm, because it would 
logically imply that the norm does not increase individual motivation for co-operation if nobody else co-
operates. Hence, existence of the norm would depend on the co-operation level. I assume in this set-up that the 
time span is too short for norm development, thus that the norm level is exogenously given. In this 
circumstance it would be wrong to determine it as a reciprocity norm, though it can be thought of as similar. 
9 Norms are supported by their implementation of unpleasant feelings like guilt and shame to the norm breaker 
(Baland and Platteau, 1996). Hence, the social disapproval need not be due to a deliberate or costly choice 
from the sanctioner. Only the suspicion that someone dislikes his behaviour, might induce the bad 
consciousness fest by the norm breaker (Nyborg and Rege, 2003). 
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of behaviour. In the end, people might not even know why they follow the norm, they just do 
it (Ostrom, 1990). If circumstances change over time, communities can end up following 
norms which actually do more harm than benefit. It will take time before they discover the 
inefficiency and manage to change the norm (Wiig, 2003). This is one of the ways norms 
develop in societies, and expectations about co-operation thus strongly depend on the 
existence of such a co-operation norm. However, expectations about co-operation in the 
specific forest project also depend on the conditions of that very project. The co-operation 
norm is based on experiences of co-operation in smaller projects, in which the individual 
sacrifice is relatively small compared to the individual sacrifice in the forest project. Even if 
people are expected to co-operate in other projects, it might be that the individual sacrifice in 
the forest project was considered higher and that expectations about co-operation thus 
decreased. The general legitimacy of the project is also important in this regard. 
Expectations about co-operation would increase if the project was considered as fair and 
efficient among the general population. The legitimacy depends on the net utility of the 
project, a valuation of the costs of lost arable land versus the benefits of forest to the whole 
community, and how people consider distributional effects of costs and benefits within the 
community. Assessment of efficiency versus equity is important for the general legitimacy 
of the project.10 But the legitimacy also depends on the process in advance of the project. 
How were people informed? Did they feel included in the management decisions? The 
information people get in advance creates their expectations about future costs and benefits, 
which affects their evaluation of the project as legitimate or not. In addition, if people feel 
they have something to say in the decision making, they might feel also that the project is 
more legitimate than otherwise. I assume that villagers agree upon the legitimacy of the 
forest project, and that they base their expectation about how many will co-operate in the 
same project on this average legitimacy. Hence, I assume that their expectation about x is 
independent of the general share of norm believers in the village, n.  n on the other side, is 
known to everybody in advance of the forest project, because it is determined as the share of 
villagers who normally co-operate in common village projects ordered by the leader. Note 
                                              
10 Collective efficiency of a project might outweigh negative distributional effects on the common legitimacy. 
Thomas et al (1986) claims that legitimacy of a social structure can support collective action even if it is only 
legitimate in terms of efficiency (validity) and not in equity. Through experiments they show that individuals 
might support a given social structure, although it generates what is collectively defined as inequity to their 
disadvantage, if they are convinced about its benefits for collective purpose.  
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that norm believing mountainside farmers are expected to co-operate in the forest project, no 
matter the legitimacy of it, due to their norm belief. Hence, a share of x is initially 
determined due to n. This effect is however not taken into account in this simplified model. I 
justify this simplification by pointing out that this effect would only increase the already 
positive effect of n on the utility for co-operation, and hence only strengthen the predictions 
of the model. 
The cost of defecting for mountainside farmer i is: qP +
x
nd
−1 , where q, P, n and d are 
exogenously given variables.  
Net present value utility 
There are two time periods in this model, period 1 and period 2. The decision of whether to 
co-operate or defect is made in period 1. Costs of defecting due to formal punishment and 
social sanctions arrive directly after the choice is made, hence the costs are considered to 
appear in period 1. The cost of lost possibilities to cultivate the mountainside garden also 
occurs in period 1, as it can be considered the net present value of all future income from 
cultivation. The net utility for mountainside farmer i is thus: 
U1i = (1-gi)( yi - qP - x
nd
−1 )   s.t. G = ∑jgj 
It takes some time for the forest to mature. The benefits from the forest therefore appear in 
period 2. Farmer i discounts future payoff with his individual factor δi. The farmer’s utility 
in period 2 is: 
U2i = βG + v(G)  0≤ β ≤1 
His present value utility seen from period 1 is thus: 
Ui(gi,G) = (1-gi)( yi - qP - x
nd
−1 ) + δi[βG + v(G)]  s.t. G = ∑jgj 
Farmer i maximises his utility and chooses to co-operate only if it gives him more utility 
than defecting. His net utility is: 
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U  = U (g =1,G) - U (g =0,G) = qP + i i i i i x
nd
−1 - y  + (δ [βG + v(G)])’    i i G
 each contributed garden on the benefits of forest is so small that the 
individual mountainside farmer does not consider it in his decision making: 
, everybody disregard the positive effect of their own contribution and their net utility 
from co-operation is independent of the total forested area. The net utility of co-operation is 
The marginal effect of
(δi[βG + v(G)])’G ≈0 
Hence
thus: 
Ui = qP + x
nd
−1 - yi  
The utility of co-operation for each farmer is positively dependent on; i) the probability of 
receiving penalties by defecting, q; ii) the penalty itself, P; iii) the share of norm followers in 
the village, n; iv) the strength of social disapproval, d; and v) the share of co-operating 
mountainside farmers, x, and negatively dependent on vi) the individual valued benefits of 
cultivating in the mountainside, y The representative farmer thus chooses co-operation if his i. 
net utility is positive, hence if: 
qP + 
x
nd  - yi > 0 , that is if yi < qP x
nd
−1+−1    
, 
 
right hand terms is less than yl. The cumulative density of yi is F(.), such that F(yl)=0 and 
F(y )=1. F(qP +
Dynamic share of co-operators 
All i mountainside farmers are associated with their individual level of land dependency, yi
distributed on an interval [yl,yh], where yl refers to the lowest value of y and yh refers to the 
highest value of y. If the sum of the two right hand terms in the inequality above is greater 
than yh, everybody will co-operate. Vice versa, everybody will defect if the sum of the two
h
x
nd
−1 ) thus determine the fraction of co-operating mountainside farmers. 
F(qP +
x
nd
−1
+
) can be seen as the share of co-operating mountainside farmers, hence x = F(qP 
x
nd
−1 ). When more mountainside farmers co-operate, the net utility from co-operation 
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increases and hence even more co-operates. This relationship induces that the outcome will 
tip in one of two directions and end up at either full co-operation or full defection. I assume 
the distribution of yi is bell shaped, and then the cumulative distribution F(qP + x
nd
−1
equilibria of x, at the crossing points of F(qP +
) has a 
s-shape like illustrated in figure 3-3. The figure illustrates that there are three possible 
x
nd
−1 ) with the curve x=x. These equilibria 
are due to the assumption that people base their choice of co-operation or defection on th
right value of x, which is the basis of the curve x=x. However, the same three equilibria will 
result if we consider this as a dynamic game. Assume that the decisions are made over a 
limited period of time, in which farmers continuously make decisions which are observable
by others. The game can thus be considered as one of several rounds with simultaneo
decisions. In the first round, farmers make their decision based solely on their expectation 
about what others will do. This is when the legitimacy of the forest project plays an 
important role, in determining the initial expectations about co-operation. However, as th
first round is played and the actual co-operation level is revealed, farmers update their 
expectations, and make their choice again, based on their latest experience. Imagine that 
everybody makes their decision based on a share of co-operators x=x’. Then, the actual shar
of co-operators will turn out to be only x’’, because only this few would want to co-oper
when x is as low as x’. In the second round, farmers base their decision on there being only 
x’’ share of co-operators, thus an even smaller share, x’’’ will co-operate in the second 
round. When this even lower level of x is revealed, farmers will again downgrade their belief
about x, and the farmers on the margin will stop co-operating because their net utility just 
tipped to be negative. Thus, the third round will reveal an even lower share of co rat
they end up at the same value, which must be at x=0, due to the assumed F(qP +
e 
 
us 
e 
e 
ate 
 
-ope ors. 
In this way, farmers’ belief about x and the actual x will continue to move together, until 
x
nd
−1 ) 
drawn in figure3-3. From figure 3-3 we see that there are only three such equilibriums, of 
which only the two, x=0 and x= xhigh, are stable. Note that the assumptions behind the 
distinct zero co-operation equilibrium is that the mountainside farmer with the low
dependency, yl , who is therefore most prone to co-operate, will be exactly on the margin
not willing to co-operate if nobody else co-operate, x=0, hence yl = qP + nd. The 
intermediate equilibrium is unstable, because only a marginal change in x will push the 
equilibrium to one of the other equilibrium. Consider a share of co-operating mountainsi
est land 
 but 
de 
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farmers at the intermediate equilibrium x=x*. If one of the defecting farmers changed his 
mind of some reason and decided to co-operate, his single contribution would imply an 
increase in x which would tip the net utility of the farmers on the margin from negative to 
positive and induce them to co-operate. Their co-operation would again increase x and 
induce even more to co-operate, and so on stepwise, until the high co-operation equilibrium 
is reached. 
 
Figure 3-3: Development of the share of co-operating mountainside farmers  
Importance of norms 
The cumulative distribution function F(qP +
x
nd
−1 ) determines a co-operation level x for 
given values of yi. Now consider two villages with different shares of norm believers. In 
village 1 (from now V1), the norm is strongly established, n=nhigh, which makes norm 
breakers feel bad and increases their motivation for co-operation. In village 2 (V2) there 
less norm believers, n= nlow. Figure 3-4 illustrates how a strong difference in norm belief 
between villages can lead to two distinct outcomes of co-operators. Through the greater 
in V2, when all other variables are equal. F1= F(qP +
are 
norm strength in V1, the individual utility of co-operation is higher for every level of x than 
x
dnhigh )  is always higher than F2 
F(qP +
−1 = 
x
dnlow
−1 ). In V1, the large amount of norm believers will impose so strong social 
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sanctions on defectors that the farmers with the lowest land dependency will co-operate, no
matter how many others who co-operate. The dynamic development of x imposes that the 
share of co-operators will always be increasing, no m  low the co-operation level 
limit
This is a stable equilibrium because yh < qP +
 
atter how
starts at. When V1 reach a co-operation level higher than x , everybody will co-operate. 
it
high
x
dn
lim1− . Hence, everybody will co-operate in 
V1. For the same distribution of i and the same levels of qP and d in V2, the fact that only 
to the movement of F(qP +
y
few believe in the norm implies that the reputation loss when defecting is smaller. According 
x
dnlow
−1 ) illustrated in figure 3-4, V2 has the possibility of reaching 
both a high level co-operation and a zero co-operation equilibrium, while V1 is sure to reach 
a high level of co-operation. In this manner, the initial share of norm believers in a village 
can determine whether the village reaches a high or low level of co-operation. The different 
norm believes in the analysed villages partly explain the different outcomes reached in the 
forest project. 
 
Figure 3-4: How an increased share of n
from low co-operation to full co-operation 
orm believers can push the equilibrium 
Importance of formal punishment 
We have seen that an exogenous shift in n can push the outcome of the forest project in the 
one or the other direction. In the same manner, an exogenous shift in the expected formal 
punishment, qP, can determine the outcome. For a higher level of expected punishment, the 
share of co-operating mountainside farmers should be increased, because the net utility of 
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co-operating increases. Now consider another village, village 9 (V9), which is at the zero co-
operation equilibrium in the first rounds of the game. Suddenly, the forest managers in V9
decide to increase the punishment for defecting, in order to convince farmers to co-opera
Two defecting farmers are chosen randomly and sent to prison, and the managers by this 
signal that other defectors can expect a similar treatment if they continue defecting. The 
punishment increases, fro to P , and farmers upgrade their expected punishment. 
from Old F9 = F(qPlow +
 
te. 
m Plow high
Thus their net utility of co-operation increases. The cumulative distribution function moves 
x
n o New F9 = F(qPhigh +d−1 ) t x
nd ), as illustrated in figure 3-5. If 
the positive shift in F(qP +
−1
x
nd
−1 ) is large enough, so that New F9 is always to the left of the 
curve x=x in figure 3-5, the increased punishment will induce more and more farmers
operate so that V9 will end up in an equilibrium in which everybody co-operates, x=1. This 
is also what actually happened in V9, which resulted in the same outcome of full co-
operation as V1 got with their high share of norm believers. V9 did not have the same share
of norm believers, so they had to use the method of increased formal sanctioning in order to 
shift the net utility of co-operation for mountainside farmers. Two of the defecting farmers 
were heavily punished at the start of the project. Other defectors started co-operating in
of obtaining th
 to co-
 
 fear 
e same punishment. Thus, managers actually only had to sanction two of the 
defectors, which set an example for all others, in order to reach the high co-operation 
equilibrium.   
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Figure 3-5: How an increase in expected penalty induces a move from the low co-
 operation equilibrium to the high co-operation equilibrium in V9
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4. Explaining the different results 
4.1 Describing the results 
In 2007, six years after tree plantings, the south side of the mountain was forested, while the 
north side was completely deforested again. Picture 4-1 is taken from the top of the 
mountain and shows the great differences between the two sides. The trees on the north sides 
disappeared in two manners; farmers destroyed tree seedlings while young in order to 
continue cultivation, and the trees which were left to mature were cut and stolen by thieves. 
This happened differently in every village, so I will give a short survey of the process and 
result in each of the six villages in focus. The map of the area in figure 4-2 illustrates the 
location of the villages and to what degree their mountainside area is forested today. 
 
Picture 4-1: View from the top of the mountain, looking westwards. The forested village 9 of 
the south side to the left, and the deforested village 6 of the north side to the right. 
Villages (V) are organised in groups. One village in each group is the leading village (the 
group village). The village leader (VL) of the group village is the group village leader 
(GVL). The villages surrounding the mountain belong to three different groups. Group A = 
V1 + seven other villages located south of it, in which V1 is the group village. Group B = 
V2, V3, V4, V5 + two other villages located east of V2, in which V2 is the group village. 
Group C = V6, V7, V8, V9, in which V8 is the group village. I have mainly focused on six 
of the nine villages; two of them with thick vigorous forest today, V1 and V9; two of them 
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completely deforested again, V4 and V5; and two of them left with a few scarcely spread 
thin trees, V2 and V3. 
 
 
Figure 4-1: Map of the mountain and the villages surrounding it. The villages (V) 
surrounding the mountain belong to three different groups; (1) group A = V1 + seven other 
villages located more south; GVA = V1, (2) group B = V2, V3, V4, V5 + two other villages 
located east; GVB = V2, and (3) group C = V6, V7, V8, V9; GVC = V8. 
Group A: Village 1 
Village 1 has a powerful leader and co-operative inhabitants. This eased conflicts and 
convinced mountainside farmers to co-operate in the forest project from start. This village 
hardly experienced sabotage by mountainside farmers, nearly all stopped cultivating when 
the trees grew up. Today, the forest stands thick and mature, and villagers within the whole 
group can be allowed to cut trees for house building once a while or for village development. 
Mountainside farmers lost all rights to their previous gardens; the whole forest is a common 
pool resource for the group, where everybody can cut grass growing between the trees, no 
matter if they initially held gardens there or not.   
 30 
Group B 
The leaders in group B are less respected and inhabitants are generally less co-ope
Many mountainside farmers sabotaged the forest project by destroying tree seedlings at the 
start of the project.  
: Village 2 and 3 
These two villages are today left with sparsely spread young trees. According to some 
sources, the mountainside land in V2 and V3 was more eroded than in other villages before 
the forest project was introduced, hence many mountainside farmers had already stopped 
cultivating. Others were forced to stop when trees were planted, while a few still cultivate in 
the mountainside. Farmers still seem to 
rative. 
have the rights to cut grass in their old gardens. The 
mountainside is only sparsely forested because trees are continuously cut before they 
mature. The main challenge in V2 and V3 is thus to prevent tree logging, not to stop 
cultivation.  
: Village 4 and 5  
Village 4 and 5 are located further away from the GVL in village 2 and are hence less 
controlled by her. In village 5, all trees were destroyed and nobody ever stopped to cultivate. 
In village 4, most mountainside farmers seem to have stopped cultivating at start, partly 
making room for the forest a few years. Later, nearly all have gradually gone back to their 
gardens, as trees have been cut by thieves or destroyed mountainside farmers themselves.  
Only a small area in village 4 still has scarce young trees, which can be seen in picture 4-2. 
 
Picture 4-2: The mountain seen from village 4. The forest project initially planted trees in this 
mountainside. Now only a few thin spots of green can be seen in the previously planted 
area. 
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Group C: Village 9 
Village 9 has its own forest history. The leader is weak and people are disunited. 
Mountainside farmers were initially fiercely sabotaging the forest project, but a strong f
committee took early action and punished resisting farmers heavily. Hard penalties sca
other mountainside farmers from defecting and saved the forest, but did seem to increas
conflict levels in the village. Village 9 might have paid an unnecessarily high price, in term
of increased social conflict, for keeping their forest. Previous owners of the mountai
gardens still seem to hold sole rights to cut grass on their plots, but nothing else. Timber is 
not distributed to villagers in need and have only one time been cut for d
orest 
red 
e 
s 
nside 
evelopment of the 
village. Trees are however stolen continuously to a large extent. Thieves are caught once in a 
while, and receive fines of 500 MKW. 
 
Picture 4-3: The forest in village 9 seen from the top of the mountain 
The rest of this chapter analyses the factors which I found to have affected the differing 
result of the forest project in the villages. Bear in mind that the analysed villages are 
relatively similar in most aspects. In the following sections I only emphasise the differences 
between villages, which I have found important in regards to the forest project result. 
4.2 Leadership 
 
h 
Leadership is essential in order to reach a co-operative outcome in collective action 
problems. A good leader may induce collective action by fostering concern for the common
good, making free-riders feel guilty and encouraging mimicry of good behaviour throug
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role models (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2004). By fostering concern for the common good, 
leaders increase the legitimacy of the project, which I assumed in the theoretical model in 
chapter 3.3 to increase farmers’ expectations of co-operation from others, which again 
, 
ay of 
flicts and power struggles in the communities (Kayambazinthu, 2000).  
 
 
el, due to the 
organisational hole it creates (Baland and Platteau, 1999). 
“There were a lot of natural resources in the mountain during Kamuzu (former president 
Banda) period…, but after the coming of democracy people have changed their good 
increase the actual co-operation. Making free-riders feel guilty and encouraging good 
behaviour are means of increasing the strength of the co-operation norm in the village, 
which is modelled as increasing the share of norm believers, who induce co-operation by 
imposing social disapproval on defectors. In this manner, good leaders increase the 
probability of reaching a co-operative outcome. This section analyses how different leaders 
have affected the outcome of the forest project in the different villages. 
The village is the basic power structure and decision-making arrangement in rural Malawi. 
The village leader (VL) uses councillors, normally relatives and acquaintances, as advisors
and calls for public meetings when there are issues relevant for the whole village. More 
important issues will first be brought to the group village leader (GVL), who might convey 
cases further to the TA (traditional authority). Information moves both ways through this 
chain; people – VL – GVL – TA. Village decisions are taken at public meetings, either at 
village or group village level. The leader introduces the issue, it is discussed publicly and a 
decision is made by consensus. This traditional democratic process is an effective w
avoiding con
Traditional leaders in Africa have lost authority due to political and economical change the 
last decades. Western educational influence has supported ideas about equal treatment and
equal access to power among all individuals and led new generations to question traditional 
power forms. The same development is evident in Malawi, by several sources blamed upon 
“the democracy”. Democratic election processes on state level have introduced the idea of a
priori equality, and it results in new ways of looking at the traditional authority system also 
at village level. Erosion of traditional power is often considered an important factor behind 
unsuccessful management of common pool resources at village lev
behaviour of not cutting trees carelessly. … Many trees have been cut down in the name of 
democracy and freedom. When I asked them why they were cutting trees like that, they 
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always said it was their freedom. So I had nothing to say because we village leaders are not 
even respected. People stopped obeying what we were telling them.” (Leader, village 3) 
rom the villagers. Highly respected leaders have a greater ability to 
persuade people to follow rules, not necessarily by imposing hard punishments, but due to 
d 
ons 
rm of co-operation in 
collective action problems, which means obeying leader’s orders and imposing some kind of 
s to be that traditional 
ed 
om 
e is feared and respected by his 
                                             
Authority of the village leaders differs between the research villages, as to respect and 
legitimacy obtained f
their reputation as trustworthy individuals. When leaders are considered as well behaved an
working for the best of the whole community, not pursuing individual interests, people are 
more willingly led by them. They follow the leader’s order, because they trust her decisi
to be right and good. This is what I consider as believing in the no
social sanctions on the ones who do not. People are not found to believe in a co-operation 
norm when their leaders behave badly and act mostly for their own personal benefit. These 
leaders are not respected, their orders are not considered to benefit others than themselves, 
and hence people do not take their orders. If nobody believes in the norm, there are also no 
sanctions imposed on the norm breakers, and no further incentives to follow it. As the power 
of traditional authorities in Malawi is eroding, the consequence seem
leaders have to earn their respect through good behaviour, to a greater extent than 
previously. 
“The trees were planted and they grew but the problem is that the group village leader 2 is 
selling them secretly. As a result people are also cutting them down at night. Nobody can 
stop them cutting the trees down. The VLs are the ones who are supposed to take action but 
they are too weak. People do not seem to take them seriously. I wish they were like a certain 
group village leader on the other side of the district. After a hill in the area was afforest
he told his people that who ever will be found cutting trees the only remedy is expulsion fr
the area. Up to now the trees are intact. But this is because h
people.” (Man, Village 3; MLTSC research project field notes11) 
 
11 Malawian Land Tenure and Social Capital Research Project collected qualitative data from villages around 
the country, included village 3 analysed in this thesis. The data is collected by Malawian research assistants 
who speak the local language. 
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4.2.1 Group village leaders  
Group A and group B have very different leaders. Group village leader of group A (GVL A
is said to have the hardest leader style in the area. People are scared of her, simply due to the
way she acts: 
“GVL A is very strong. She’s hard if people don’t work. It is not that she punishes them, I 
never heard of that, it is the way she speaks to people. They are scared of her. For example, 
look at the forest in the mountainside, people in group A are too scared to cut the trees 
) 
 
down, while at the other side the forest is gone.” (Man, group A) 
nt of 
money . I take the fact that so many still come to the group leader with conflicting issues as 
e 
 of 
 
e 
n, 
t to her 
respect in other regards, have contributed to a low share of norm believers, at least in her 
own village, V2, but probably also in the whole of group B. 
“GVL B is always in conflict with her people and that is why you don’t see any development 
Though feared, this leader is also highly respected. Almost daily, villagers from all eight 
villages under her group come to her courtyard to ask advice or for a court sentence in 
conflicts. For such court cases both parts in the conflict has to pay a considerable amou
12
a sign of their faith in her judgements. Their faith in her behaviour is what I believe hav
convinced them to believe in the co-operation norm. 
Whereas GVL A is highly respected, and hence gets a lot done in her villages, the leader
group B (GVL B) seem to have a lower position. She is said to be much weaker and not able 
to control her people. Her limited role in solving village conflicts might be a sign of less
control over village life. During my seven weeks stay in the villages, GVL B was only onc
called to solve a conflict. This dispute was however too difficult for her to settle on her ow
so she sent the case further to the TA. My impression is that this lack of cases brough
is a sign of little faith in her abilities to settle disputes fairly, which, in addition to little 
like in Village I.… She has also been trying to grab land from her people. With that do you 
think people will love her? We are just watching her”. (Old woman, V2) 
                                              
12 Each part in the conflict must pay 200 K (US$1,4) to get the conflict judged. Traditionally, the premium was
one chicken from each part, bu
 
t this have lately turned out to be too expensive for the villagers.  
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As this old woman in V2 hints, GVL B is short of land. She has many daughters, who all 
have been allocated land from her, due to matrilineal custom. None of them, however, have 
enough land, and several of them rent land, something it seems like a chief’s family is not 
esearch project field notes). Just the fact that the village leader, 
who is supposed to control all village customary land (on powers delegated from the TA), is 
in Village 2, people just sit down. If there is a dispute, everyone will 
  
ople’s arguments. In the end, she is the one who concludes the discussion with a 
final decision, based on the arguments she finds appropriate. Under similar meetings in 
 B, GVL B is seated on the ground among her people and discusses the issues in the 
VL 
                                             
supposed to do13 (MLTSC r
lacking land, can have contributed to eroding her authority in the village. The power of a 
leader is originally based on controlling land14. A chief without land might hence loose her 
legitimacy as chief, also because little land makes her poor. A man in village 2 to some 
extent confirms this hypothesis: 
 “GVL A is much more powerful and respected than GVL B. In Village 1, the response is 
rapid and positive, but 
follow what is said in group A but not in group B.  GVL B is even renting land herself. This 
gives her an even weaker position.” (Man, V2; MLTSC research project field notes) 
The difference in authority between the two leaders came clear when attending public 
meetings in the two groups. GVL A behaves like a boss. She takes seating on a chair in the 
high end of the meeting, while people are sitting on the ground in front of her. People 
discuss one at a time. The leader contributes with facts and explanations, and otherwise 
listens to pe
group
same manner as everybody else. People do not seem to listen more to their leader than to 
anybody else, and arguments are often interrupted. Coming to the decision making, 
decisions seem to be made in consensus to a greater extent in group B than in group A. G
 
13 Traditionally, renting land has been unheard of in Malawi, because land has been abundant. Lately, rules 
eriod 
npopulated area and hence claimed 
rights to this land. Newcomers would later have to get permission from these first people to settle on their land. 
 
concerning this and other land issues are changing, due to increased pressure on land and modernisation 
efforts. Rules of today, according to the TA of the area, state that it is allowed to rent out land, but for a p
of maximum 2 years to the same person. 
14 Chieftaincies initially emerged when a clan came to settle down in an u
In this way the village developed. The first settlers hold rights to the chieftaincy, which is inherited within their
clan. Although leaders today do not have any land to allocate to newcomers, the role of leaders is still closely 
related to the control of land. 
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A has a more authoritarian leader style than GVL B, which seems to be respected in gro
because her decisions are considered fair and efficient.  
4.2.2 Village leaders 
The group village leaders discussed above also function as village leaders in their own 
village. A village leader, a
up A 
lso referred to as chief, has the daily contact with his15 villagers, 
as he lives in the village among them (in nearly all cases). He is the one they bring their 
ms and conflicts to and he is the one who knows and sees what is going on in village 
 GVL A and VL2 = GVL 
B. VL1 is respected to a larger extent than the other leaders in the analysed villages. She 
 believers by taking control and working 
ob she 
ong 
ral 
n V2, as she is reputed to distribute large parts of outside help within her own 
17
proble
daily life. The village leader is thus very important in terms of making people contribute to 
village development.   
VL1 
VL1 and VL2 are already discussed, as they are the same as VL1 =
seems to have contributed to the high share of norm
devotedly for village development. My respondents were all over satisfied with the j
does as village leader. My impression is that she distributes goods16 relatively fairly am
villagers.  
VL2 
VL2 seem to obtain less respect and obedience from her villagers, partly due to her libe
leader style. However, her personal behaviour also seems to have contributed to her weak 
position i
family. An example of this self-pursuing behaviour is a case in which Oxfam  gave 15 
                                              
15 This gender form is used for simplicity. Both men and women are village leaders in this area. 
16 Development organisations and governmental offices once in a while, especially during times of hunger, 
distribute help in forms of food, clothes or equipment to rural villages. The help is normally given to the 
hiradzulu district. They mostly support local CBOs with training in skills, management 
, but also distributes material help among poor villagers once in a while. 
village leader, who is supposed to distribute according to the donor’s intensions. However, leaders often take 
large parts for themselves and their close friends and relatives, but this behaviour of course differs among 
leaders. Such distributions seem to cause many conflicts in the villages. 
17 Oxfam, an international confederation of 13 development organisations, is the only NGO currently working 
at community level in C
and organisational work
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goats to be distributed as a gift to the poorest households in the village. The VL listed the 15 
ll 
ife 
e 
 
 their 
at the leader is not as respected as the leaders in 
V1 and V5, due to the way she acts and the way her villagers behave towards her. The 
, an old woman, also without land, behaves disrespectfully, according to this village 
, 
illages. 
This implies that the social norm of co-operation in village project is not as generally shared 
“poorest” villages to receive a goat each, a list which suspiciously included all ten 
households in her own close family, from a village of 69 households. It is my impression 
that these households are at the same wealth level as most others in the village, hence that 
the VL to some degree favours her own family. This is probably a general pattern in a
villages, but seems to occur to a greater extent, or at least be less accepted among villagers, 
in V2 than in V1 and V5. 
VL3  
Village 3 is lead by an old man who is drunk most days and puts little effort into village l
and development. Much work is in practice delegated to others, but the VL is the one 
representing the village at group meetings and the one who distributes goods and is 
consulted for the most serious issues. He does not control his people to any considerabl
extent, but does not seem to be very interested in doing so either.  
VL4 
Village 4 has some aspects different from the other villages. The people have a bad 
reputation in neighbouring villages for being thieves, bad-behaved, dangerous and not 
listening to their leaders. According to my observations, at least the latter is likely to be
relevant. Compared to V1 and V5, few villagers in V4 seem to make an effort to follow
leader’s orders. Overall, my impression is th
leader
woman: 
“… she (the VL) is a problem sometimes. She shouts at us when she speaks, “don’t let your 
goats go there and there”, and so forth. She gives orders like she has great powers, only 
because she is VL. It doesn’t bother me much, I just don’t take into account whatever she is 
saying.” (Woman, V4) 
According to my observations in V4, many villagers do not obey their leader’s orders, and
more importantly, this non co-operative behaviour seems to be accepted by other v
as it is in village 1. 
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VL5 
The leader of village 5 was also in weak powers at the time of the forest project, according 
to local sources. However, his power changed around 2004/2005 due to new governmen
policies. At this time, the government decided to subsidize poor farmers with fertilizer, as
step towards increasing agricultural production and making subsistence farmers self-
supplied with food. Each household was supposed to obtain one coupon which could be use
to buy subsidised fertilizer. These coupons became extremely important for the populatio
which mainly consists of pure subsistence farmers, who never could have afforded fertiliz
without the subsidy coupons. Village leaders were given the task of distributing the coupons. 
This new system increased the chiefs’ power in V5. Suddenly, it was beneficial to be on 
good terms with the chief and people started coming when he called in for public meetings 
and contributing to public works when he ordered
t 
 a 
d 
n, 
er 
 it. People now got incentives to co-
operate in village projects. The external positive shift in leader’s power brought a new 
equilibrium in people’s behaviour and a new co-operational atmosphere, which developed 
5. However, the new co-operation norm came too late to 
benefit the forest project. The trees planted in the forest project were cut down relatively 
Village 9 also has a special history of leadership. The village is divided in two when it 
f. One generation ago, the leadership belonged to 
s. 
Leaders’ authority in the villages seems to have affected the forest outcome through their 
ability to convince people to co-operate, and hence creating a norm of co-operation. A high 
into a norm of co-operation in V
immediately after planting and people never stopped cultivation, as the norm had not yet 
developed. Other villages were also given this new system of fertilizer subsidy coupons; did 
it increase the powers of the chiefs in other villages than V5? Probably yes, but of the 
villages I visited, it was only in village 5 I found such a considerable change in leader 
powers and this was the explanation I got.  
VL9 
comes to support of the current chie
another clan. As the old chief died and her clan was in a weak position, a man from another 
clan managed to take over the chief position, with great protests from the original clan. This 
conflict of the leadership has left the village split. Half of the population does not support the 
leader and don’t contribute to public works nor obey his orders. They claim that he 
distributes outside help only to members of his own clan. This leader thus seems to have 
little ability to convince his villagers to co-operate in collective action problem
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share of norm believers in V1 increased net utility of co-operation, through fear of social 
disapproval and by increasing expectations about co-operative behaviour from oth
everybody was aware of the reputation cost of defecting, and thus people expected few 
others to defect. The mere expectations about high co-operation have probably increased 
farmers’ evaluation of the project and hence induced co-operation. All other analysed 
villages initially had less respected leaders, who did not manage to convince their v
about general co-operation, 
ers. In V1, 
illagers 
and thus expectations about co-operational behaviour in the 
forest project were also lower. It should be emphasized that the causality between leader 
ction in 
e 
t 
e 
 
e 
behaviour and share of norm believers in a village is unknown and probably goes both ways. 
Improper leader behaviour might result in few norm believers, but an initial low share of 
norm believers also lowers leader’s motivation for village development and hence might as 
well contribute to illegitimate leader behaviour. 
4.3 Project design 
Institutional design and how decisions are made can overcome barriers to collective a
forest management (Varughese and Ostrom, 2001).  Different management schemes wer
imposed in the analysed villages and have affected net utility of co-operation for the 
individual mountainside farmer, especially through formal punishment. In addition, 
efficiency and distribution of benefits from the forest, and the implementation process, 
affected the general legitimacy of the forest project, which again affected expectations abou
others’ behaviour.  
4.3.1 Forest committees 
The first public meeting concerning the forest project in 2000 elected three supervising 
committees. One was the leading umbrella committee for the two other sub committees. 
There was one sub committee for group A and B, including V1, V2, V3, V4 and V5, and on
subcommittee for group C, including V6, V7, V8 and V9. These committees were supposed
to manage the forest project and be responsible for the outcome, in co-operation with villag
leaders.  
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Each of the tree committees consisted of ten members. Several village leaders were among 
these. At the election meeting, people present from each village chose their own 
 
ers 
 
 
n 
roup C still 
works for this purpose. They have the highest authority over the forest in group C and decide 
 
ith no power 
r 
. In 
 is 
A 
representatives for the committees. However, not all villages were represented, while other
villages had several representatives. In the subcommittee for group A and B, most memb
came from villages under group A. V2, V3, V4 and V5 were not represented at all. This is 
probably due to their low attendance at the election meeting, indicating low initial 
enthusiasm for the project. 
The committee members were paid the first months of the project, when nursery beds and
plantings were made. The payment stopped when government withdrew from the project and
it was left in the hands of the communities alone. Many members stopped working at that 
time, in March 2001. However, all members left were still active in the forest management 
work the first three years. They had regular meetings, guarded the forest and made decisio
about forest rules and policies for harvesting of timber. The sub committee for g
whether people should be given permissions to cut trees or not. They co-operate well with 
the village leaders, and this gives the committees legitimacy for their activities. The 
subcommittee for group A and B has a more difficult time co-operating with the chiefs, 
especially GVL A. She was not satisfied with the work of the committee and therefore took
the full management role herself. She sacked the committee, leaving them w
over the forest in group A. The committee leader has complained this degradation of powe
to the TA, but has not come any further with his claims by now. Since most of the original 
members in this committee came from group A, they have resigned from the work, and the 
committee is not active anymore. Hence, neither group A nor group B have any managing 
committee, and the full responsibility is left with the group and village leaders.  
Comparing with the faithful work of the sub committee of group C, it would have been 
favourable if groups A and B had assigned the power between leaders and committees
lack of a working committee, all responsibility is left on the shoulders of the leaders. As
the case in group B, the leaders are not strong enough to manage the forest successfully. 
supervising committee, consisting of members representing all villagers, could have had a 
better chance of inducing co-operative norms in the villages and leading the forest project 
towards the better outcome. 
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4.3.2 Project implementation  
The local communities were not given a choice of whether to receive the forest project or 
not, the implementation was considered a government order. VL1 seems to be the only 
leader surrounding the mountain who welcomed the forest project and devoted efforts to its 
success already from the start phase. The other leaders were probably aware that the project 
would induce conflicts with the mountainside farmers, which they would have problems 
handling. As VL1 was more concerned about the forest project, she seems to have m
larger efforts informing her villagers about the beneficial effects of trees and persuading 
them to co-operate. Still, most mountainside farmers, and also some in village 1, claim they
never heard about the project before workers came to their gardens to plant the seedlings. 
There was an information meeting concerning the project in advance, but it seems that few 
people attended this meeting. Thus, the information they got was probably not more tha
that the government wanted to plant trees and that th
ade 
 
n 
ey had to stop cultivating. 
re 
led 
 
ature trees were 
to be used only for development work in the village or for house building for the poor. These 
p 
while. However, proper information about the future benefits of forest, how it would prevent 
erosion and how timber was going to be distributed, would have increased the legitimacy of 
“We were not told of the project in advance. We heard that there was a meeting somewhe
far away, not in the village, but our VL did not inform us about this meeting. He never cal
for a meeting, if he had then all the problems would have been avoided, people would have
obeyed. We only heard the rumour that trees were to be planted in the mountain, and that 
those who continued to cultivate would be taken to the police.” (Man, V9) 
According to my respondents, nobody knew in advance how the user rights to the timber 
were going to be distributed. Rules for use of the future timber were decided upon in March, 
shortly after plantings. The same rules held for the whole mountain. The m
rules were spread to people at public meetings at group level, but again not all people attend 
such meetings. Village 4 and 5 are especially badly represented at public meetings in grou
B. This may be due to dislike of their group leader, but may also be due to the longer 
distance they have to walk to reach the meeting ground. Present or not, rumours spread 
easily in these villages, hence most people should have obtained the information after a 
the forest project and thus increased incentives for co-operation. 
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4.3.3 Control and expected penalty 
Expected punishment imposed on defecting mountainside farmers is a considerable variable
in their decision of whether to co-operate or not. The harder the penalties and the more 
probable their occurrence, the more costly it will be to defect. How did expected punishm
influence the choice of mountainside farmers in the research villages? They all got some of 
the same message regarding punishment of defectors; those who continued to cultivate their 
plots or uprooted trees in the mountainside would be taken to the police. Threats of 
punishments are often stated from VLs when they need to induce people to follow orders. 
Such threats usually refer to not being listed for fertilizer distribution or other community 
benefits. Police custody is quite a fearful threat in this context.18 In the case of the forest, 
that threat was put forward by the MoP, Mbewe, who put more weight behind the threat as 
he was a government representative. His random visits to the forest scared many from 
damaging the trees as long as he was in parliament. 
The responsibility of guarding the forest and punishing defectors was held by VLs in co-
operation with the committees. The question is, however, if people really expected forest 
managers to be hard enough to implements these heavy threats in the end. In V3, V4, V5, 
V6, V7 and V9, people sabotag
 
ent 
ed the forest project by uprooting trees, pouring salt over the 
 
 
 
seedlings or set the mountainside ablaze to prevent trees from growing. Only in V9, two of 
these defectors were actually sent to the police. The two men were said to be the forefront
saboteurs in their village, encouraging others to do the same. Due to lack of evidence, the
two men got away with two days in police custody and were then discharged by a local 
court. However, the incidence put an abrupt stop to the defecting in V9.  
Rumours of police custody did not seem to scare defectors on the other side of the mountain. 
In villages 3, 4 and 5, cutting of trees continued. It was most extreme in village 5, where 
nobody ever stopped to cultivate and the forest was continuously kept down. In V2, V3 and
V4, the trees grew to some extent and most people stopped cultivating, until MoP Mbewe 
withdrew from politics in 2004, taking with him the threat of government sanctions and 
                                              
18 Governmental punishments have a fearful reputation in Malawi, due to the hard treatments during Banda’s 
dictatorship (1963-1994). Although Banda was removed in 1994 and democracy since then has softened up ol
systems, government officials and policy still has a job to do to ascertain Malawians that their government
acting for the best of the people. Police custody was therefore seen as a very scary punishment. 
d 
 is 
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starting a new era of forest cutting at the mountain. GVL B did try to convince people in h
group of not cutting trees, but she was not obeyed. She was only able to control a small 
forested area close to her own home in V2, guarded by her own presence. She hired guar
to patro
er 
ds 
l the whole forest in group B, but as people knew who they were and when they were 
guarding, they kept illegal cutting activities to times without guarding. When asked, my 
garden 
 
e 
 
would cut the tree, leaving a stem. Blue 
gum trees are fast growing and resistant species, and will grow up again after being cut in 
e 
 
 
n their 
 
mountainside farmers did not seem to risk much by this behaviour. The few who were 
informants claim that they do not know who has been damaging the trees. It might be 
holders who want to go back to cultivate or it might be regular tree thieves. Nobody has been
punished for still cultivating in the mountainside, because there is no evidence that they ar
the ones who have damaged the trees. They say that others have destroyed the trees on their 
plot, and that they returned to cultivate only because there were no trees left. This is 
however unlikely. A thief stealing trees for its timber value would first of all not cut the tree
until it was to some extent mature and secondly he 
this way. If you want to prevent the tree from ever coming up again you have to destroy the 
root. This was done by pouring salt over the roots, setting the mountainside ablaze or up-
rooting the seedlings one by one. It is unlikely that these damaging activities have been don
by people wanting timber. It must be done by garden holders themselves, or alternatively by 
people wanting to help them.  
However, garden holders were not punished when trees were destroyed in their own garden, 
due to lack of evidence. My interpretation of this low ability to punish defectors is that it 
pictures the low authority of group B leaders among their people. This being said, many 
trees were also cut by the stem, which did not kill them, but prevented them from taking
much nutrition from the cultivated crops as they were still small. When the trees then 
matured and occupied precious soil nutrition, they were again cut by the stem. This practice
is still done by some of the mountainside farmers who have densely spread trees left i
gardens. By trimming the trees in this manner, it is possible to harvest nearly as much as if
the trees were not there. However, the trees then do not fulfil the main purpose of preventing 
erosion. Nor do they provide as much timber as they optimally could, because they are cut 
too early, only a few months old. As these trees are cut by the stem, it is possible that it 
sometimes is done by people stealing firewood, and not necessarily the mountainside 
farmers themselves. However, according to the small size of these trees, it is likely that the 
holders of the gardens are responsible for most cases of damaged trees themselves. Yet, 
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punished for destroying trees in group B were caught in the very act or for possession of 
blue gum trees in their homes. The penalty was a fine of 200 MKW, a considerably smaller 
penalty than that in village 9, where two of the defectors got police custody and tria
court.  
“… they (people of villages 4, 5 and 6) uprooted the trees in order to continue 
cultiva
l in 
ting up mountain. Though it was stated by the village leaders that people who 
had gardens in the area planted with trees should stop cultivating, it did not work. 
As the forest matured and got valuable for its timber in V1 and V9, another issue came into 
place; to protect the trees from firewood thieves. Trees are stolen every month, which is a 
current problem for the forested villages. They say the thieves come at night, and that they 
come from all around the area, not necessarily the same village. However, it seems unlikely 
that someone can fell a tree with axe and carry it down without anybody hearing it. It 
probably means that people don’t report such incidents to their leaders. A story from V9 
illustrates how this can happen. As I was finishing up an interview with an old woman living 
high up in the mountainside near the forest, we saw some children carrying small trees and 
branches for firewood down from the forest. When I asked, the woman replied that it was 
not allowed and that they would be fined if the chief got to know about it: “It doesn’t 
happen often in this village, because people are afraid. Others might report to the 
t report such things myself. It isn’t 
d to report on each other.”  This woman lives in a village in which half of the 
e 
n 
People feel closer to their fellow villagers than their leader, and hence they do not report on 
each other. This probably holds at least for the people belonging to the group not supporting 
Besides uprooting the trees, people have kept setting the mountain ablaze, damaging 
the trees in the process. But, people of villages 1, 8 and 9, which have thick forest 
today, obeyed their leaders. In short, leaders of those villages are more powerful as 
compared to the other villages.” (Woman, V6) 
chief when they see something like that. I will no
goo
population do not support the current VL as the legitimate chief and hence it is likely that 
more people are prone to think like her when it comes to reporting on others behaviour. Th
hard sanctions imposed at the project start by the committee and the general conflict level i
the village has probably contributed to this unwilling behaviour from possible reporters. 
the chief, but might be different for the supportive half. Nevertheless, stealing trees is a 
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dangerous business in this village with general low trust levels. After all, it seems to be done 
quite often. Thieves are caught once in a while, last time a few months before my fieldwork
when a group of people were fined 500 MKW each. They were taken by the forest 
committee, which got a tip from other villagers that these people had cut trees in the
The committee found blue gum trees (the main tree specie growing in the fo
, 
 forest. 
rest, but which 
can also be bought at the market) at their compounds, which was considered as evidence for 
00 
n the 
orest outcome? The arrest of the two men in V9 
proved that the committee was able and willing to enforce its threats on defectors. It stated 
xample towards the rest of the mountainside farmers, who were scared off from resisting 
ple of what could happen to people cutting trees and 
f 
V1 
ost. 
 
theft. 
Theft of trees does not seem to happen as often in V1, as people are scared of VL1 who also 
lives close to the forest. However, thieves have occasionally been caught in these villages 
too, and are then charged approximately the market value of the tree stolen, around 250-5
MKW. The penalties are low compared to national forest laws19, because few people i
villages are able to pay any more.   
How did expected penalties affect the f
an e
orders any more. This early display of power from the committee was a major contribution 
to the fact that the forest still exists in V9 today. The committee is still active and has the 
main responsibility for guarding against and punishing tree-thieves. Hence, their first heavy 
sanctioning still stands as an exam
hence protects the forest from further damages. In the other villages, nobody took this role o
enforcing harsh punishments, and defecting was never as risky. 
4.3.4 Who benefits from the timber? 
Village 1 is the village which has fulfilled the harvesting intentions from the project at m
All villagers from group A (from all eight villages) can ask GVL A for permission to cut 
some trees if they need poles for building a house. She gives permission to everybody, no
matter how poor or rich, but only for a limited amount of trees, normally two or three. The 
                                              
19 Punishment for cutting trees illegally in forests managed by national governments is either 5 years in prison 
or a fine of 15.000 MKW. 
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support is enough to build a small house. The only use which will be considered is poles for
house building, as this is only occasionally needed. Firewood, on the other hand, is 
in every household every day. If this demand would be met from the forest supply, the forest
would soon be depleted again. The only exceptions are a very few cases of village 
development projects, in which trees have been given for use of firewood.  
V9 
In village 9, the system is a little bit different. Villagers must ask the forest committee for 
permission to cut trees if they 
 
needed 
 
need. The committee has by now not given such permissions, 
because they do not think the forest is mature enough. They need to set up a policy for tree 
my respondents complain about her behaviour, like this 
guy: 
o ask for trees) she is always refusing them. But when people 
go with a little something she tells them to go and cut down the trees at night. I think we 
 
e 
cessarily the needy 
harvesting, which they have not yet decided on. Some villagers have asked for trees, but 
have not been given. Hence, the mountainside farmers, who were already ill-mooded 
regarding the forest and loss of user rights to their land, feel sure that they will never see 
anything to the timber values.  
V2 
One major reason of GVL B’s low ability to prevent tree-cutting is the rumour that she is 
logging trees illegally herself. Hence, her legitimacy when trying to convince people to take 
care of the forest is limited. Many of 
“Whenever people go there (t
should just be going there to cut at night without first going to her. She thinks it is her forest.
Her daughters and granddaughters go there and cut trees anytime for any use. People hav
been seeing them.” (Guy, V2) 
A man in another village belonging to group B complains about the same thing: 
“There is some kind of biasness regarding the trees towards the clan of GVL B. Some people 
can go and get 2-3 trees for free, but I would have to pay. It is not ne
people who get trees. The trees are supposed to be for the community, but the GVL is selling 
the trees like her own business.” (Man, group B) 
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I could also observe this process. GVL B’s household used poles taken from the moun
forest for firewood most days. I
tain 
n such a small and open village, where people live 
everywhere, nobody can steal trees regularly without everybody else getting to know about 
tions 
hus have 
some expectations of this also regarding the forest project. When they expect that the 
 or stolen by thieves, leaving them as suckers in 
the game, their willingness to co-operate decreases because of two things: First, their utility 
e 
ts 
ped 
independently of these two variables, rather from exogenous properties of people in the 
group. According to my respondents on the south side of the mountain, it is the people in the 
selves who are the problem, not their leaders: 
ur 
no 
respect and do whatever they want. Their leaders fail to handle them in fear of getting 
it. Hence, her behaviour probably affects the behaviour of all people under her group, not 
only in her own village. People are not likely to listen to their chief as long as she does not 
follow the rules herself. This behaviour leads to acceptance for not obeying her orders. She 
has however been able to keep a few trees in her own village, probably because she lives 
very close to the forest and is able to catch thieves herself. In the other villages of group B, 
the mountainside is all bare.  
The question is not only how timber was distributed in the end, but more which expecta
mountainside farmers had about it in advance. According to their previous experiences, they 
might have had a clue about the general distribution of benefits in the village, and t
benefits will be captured by the village elite
of a forested mountainside is lower and hence their direct incentives for contributing and 
inducing others to contribute, weakens. Secondly, general respect for the leader and belief in 
the norm of co-operation decreases.  
4.4 Social capital 
I have argued that VL1 is more powerful than the other village leaders, meaning that peopl
obey her orders to a larger extent, which I have taken as a sign of a stronger co-operation 
norm. The existence of a co-operation norm is not necessarily only due to personality trea
of the leader or the design of institutional change. Such a norm might have develo
northern villages them
“The people of V3, V4, V5 and V6 are very troublesome. If you are chief there, you fear yo
own people. Especially in V4 they have a bad behaviour. They are very dangerous, have 
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beaten up. The VL wants to control the trees, but people don’t listen to her.”  (Forest 
committee headman, group A) 
In this chapter I argue that there is less social capital in group B and V9 than in group A, and 
ers in the 
nformal 
 
ars 
as established in group A by local 
 a sign of relatively high co-operative abilities 
in group A already then, which was around the same time as the start of the forest project. In 
ial and 
that the low levels of social capital is partly explaining the low share of norm believ
former villages. Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) defines social capital by three main 
principles: “(1) social capital generates positive externalities for members of a group; (2) 
these externalities are achieved through shared trust, norms and values and their consequent 
effects on expectations and behaviour; (3) shared trust, norms and values arise from i
forms of organisations based on social networks and associations”. Estimating social capital 
is not an easy task, due to the elusiveness of the concept. I take each community as an 
analysing unit, focusing on the ways in which community members interact and collaborate
on issues of shared concern, an approach recommended by Dudwick et al (2004).  
4.4.1 Inter village co-operation 
Formal co-operation between inhabitants of different villages nearly did not exist some ye
ago, until a CBO (community based organisation)20 w
volunteers around year 2002. This initiative is
2005, Oxfam21 became an umbrella organisation which supported CBOs with financ
advisory help and convinced the group A CBO to include group B and 3 in their 
organisation. The merged CBO, in co-operation with Oxfam, has since then coordinated 
development projects across village borders, in which villagers must co-operate and work 
together. This has given villagers positive experiences of co-operation between them and 
increased the willingness of co-operation also in other regards. The co-operation norm is 
thus strengthened on a general level compared to the forest project start in 2001. 
                                              
20 Community based organisations are funded and managed locally, aiming at local management of local 
problems. CBOs were initially established in order to handle the HIV/AIDS epidemic and started locally 
managed care of sick and orphans. Today they work as umbrella organisations for community development 
committees, working with youth and women empowerment, health and care, agricultural productivity and 
educational training.  
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“After the CBO and different projects that work across village borders, it is more co-
operation between the villages. People from different villages work together in the sa
projects and increased their understandin
me 
g of each other.” (CBO-director) 
ly 
  
-
operation hard. Few villagers were willing to work with erecting the school building and the 
 time of fieldwork, none of the schools were 
running. Low trust between villages and low willingness to work without payment seem to 
      
Such projects includes the building of bridges and schools in the communities, and 
establishing village development committees, which work with orphans, aids, care for sick 
and elders, youth training, agricultural advising or other development works across villages. 
Even if such projects increase understanding between villages, co-operation abilities are still 
very limited between villages in group B. The most recent CBO project serves as an 
example. The CBO wanted to build nursery schools for children under school age, especial
orphans, to give the youngest children some educational activities and care at daytime. 
Oxfam offered financial support and the CBO decided that three and three villages were to 
share one school. The location of the schools turned out to a main conflict in group B. 
“People are different in the different villages. People of V4 only think of themselves, they 
are individualists. They are thieves and have a bad behaviour. A reason for placing the 
nursery school in V4 was to give them a chance, try to change their behaviour by giving 
them this responsibility.” (CBO director of the area) 
This plan did not go well with V3, however: 
“People in V4 like to fight, so we cannot send our children to school there.” (VL3) 
Long distance and little general contact between villages made trust difficult and co
teachers soon quit the voluntary work. At the
be main reasons for failure of the nursery school project in group B. On the other hand, the 
three nursery schools in group A are working very well, although builders and teachers are 
equally unpaid. I see this as an example that villages in group A co-operate better and trust 
each other more across village boundaries than group B villages do. Abilities to co-operate 
                                                                                                                                     
rking 
and 
21 Oxfam, an international confederation of 13 development organisations, is the only NGO currently wo
at community level in Chiradzulu district. They support local CBOs with training in skills, management 
organisational work. 
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between villages are also most probably related to ability of co-operation within villages, 
therefore the example also indicates higher levels of trust and a stronger norm of co-
operation in V1 than in group B villages. 
Especially V4 has a bad reputation among neighbouring villages. My respondent in other 
d 
e been 
n 
re 
iour 
and hence have affected the forest 
outcome by inducing expectations about a low share of co-operators within the village. But 
ve 
villages considered most inhabitants of V4 as thieves, because they behave differently an
possess a lot of valuable good, which people from other villages claim they must hav
stealing in town. They, however, say that they earn their money by doing legal businesses i
town. I did indeed observe a quite different behaviour in V4; we, as foreigners, were not 
greeted as kindly as in other villages, women played money games publicly (“a sin” other 
places) and people tended to interrupt us and each other during interviews. Whether they a
thieves or not doesn’t actually make a difference, as long as they have a different behav
and obviously are not trusted among other villages. Low trust between villages might 
indicate a general low trust level also within the village, 
low trust in neighbouring villages might also have affected the forest outcome directly, as 
the share of co-operators in one village in some senses also affects the utility of the forest 
project in the neighbouring village. Forest in the mountainside of one village would prevent 
soil erosion in the valley, also in the area of the neighbouring village. If one believes that the 
neighbouring village consists of defectors, who will not contribute to prevent soil erosion 
and afterwards might even steel trees from other village when they mature, it increases ones 
perceived risk of ending up as a sucker, and decreases incentives for co-operation. 
4.4.2 Village level co-operation 
I focus on two indicators of co-operation in the villages, which reflects the share of norm 
believers; membership of village development committees and contributions to public 
works. The new system of village development through CBO and Oxfam’s strategy of 
building civic capacity in the communities has resulted in a whole lot of different 
committees which are supposed to work for village development. V3, for example, ha
seven such committees; orphan committee, home based care committee, youth club, aids 
committee, health committee, development committee and human rights committee. In 
addition they have members in the CBO committee at group level. All villages have a 
similar amount of such committees, with only slightly different names, and it does not seem 
 51
to be any considerable differences between villages in the number of such committees or the 
work they get done. Every committee consists of ten or twelve members, who contribute 
more or less to the committee work. As far as I could observe, the productivity of th
committees is quite low, as a VL confirms: 
“It is a problem with these committees; people don’t like working for free. It was better 
before, then people volunteered for the committees and the people who joined were 
interested in doing the job. Now people are mostly just pointed out to join the committees, 
even if they don’t want. Almost everybody in the village is member of some committee! When 
people are not willing to join the committee, they don’t care and won’t do the job at the end 
of the day. You know, most people join committees because they think they will be sent to 
seminars, wh
ese 
ere they will get some money. But when they experience that there are no 
seminars, they have other things to do, and quit working in the committee.” (Leader, one of 
In V2, V3, V4 and V9, few contribute to public works when the leaders order it, and those 
f fertilizer 
subsidies. (The one exception was V5, where the fair distribution of fertilizer subsidies seem 
s discussed in chapter 4.2) The share of left-
out people was especially high in V2, V3 and V9, where they also consisted of people who 
 the 
ho 
orrupt leader or the non-co-operating villagers? For this 
not. It did not seem to be such groupings within villagers in V1. Some complained about an 
the villages in group B not bordering on the mountain)  
The second indicator of village norm believers is contribution to public works in the village. 
who do are mainly relatives of the leader. Non-relatives of the VL claim that they won’t 
contribute to public works because they do not receive outside help when such are 
distributed. Relatives of the leader and the village elite often capture such benefits. In all but 
one of the villages I visited, people were complaining about an elite capture o
to have given the chief new power and respect, a
were obviously “poor enough” to qualify for a subsidy coupon. In these villages, it was quite 
certain that mostly relatives and acquaintances of the leaders benefited. The VLs, on
other hand, claim that they do not give certain villagers fertilizer coupons or other kinds of 
help, because these people do not contribute to public works when they are asked. So, w
started? What came first; the c
purpose I only state that there are often groupings within the villages, determined by 
relatives and close friends of the VL, the village elite, in one camp and non-relatives in the 
other. Members of the village elite both do the job and take the benefits. The difference to 
V1 was that everybody contributed to public works, no matter if they got such subsidies or 
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unfair distribution, but it did not hinder them to do public works with the rest of the vill
Hence, V1 ha
age. 
s a higher share of norm believers than the other villages. The villagers have 
experienced several successful community projects, in which nearly all inhabitants 
 as a sucker 
one. 
n 
rom her, which meant a lot of hard work wasted. Yet, 
rt 
 
 a strong norm of co-operation in V1. 
ganised co-operation 
“Nobody in the village help me when I have problems with too little food, I cannot 
ask them. Last year one of my grandchildren got sick. I tried to approach many 
lp 
contributed. They all know that the share of norm believers is high in their village and thus 
they expect everybody to co-operate also in future projects. The risk of ending up
is low. The inhabitants of V1 seem to value the benefits they receive from being a 
community and the benefits the community development work brings to each and every
A woman who gave up her mountainside land for the forest project, in spite of severe 
poverty and land dependency, confirms this community spirit. She had cleared the garde
only two years before it was taken f
when asked about how she greeted the forest project, she emphasized its benefits to the 
community: 
“Because I had only been cultivating it (the garden in the mountainside) for such a sho
period of time, it didn’t hurt me too much that I had to give up the plot. The trees are 
benefiting the community, so it is mostly a good thing.” (Woman, V1) 
When people in a similar poor situation in other villages were asked the same question, 
emphasize was always put on how dependent they were on the land and how unfair it was to 
take it away from them. The fact that she thinks about the benefit of the community is quite
uncommon in my view, and represents
4.4.3 Self-or
Self-organised co-operation, not managed on village level by committees or VLs, are rare in 
these villages. Generally, people do not share food in hard times, because few have 
something extra to share. Some people have a few close friends or relatives who assist each 
other with small things during sickness or other emergencies, but many are left without 
anybody, as this old woman: 
people in this village, but nobody helped. They have their own needs. I get no he
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from my relatives, they are all drunkards. They have their own problems.” (Old
woman, V
 
3) 
ng 
 their 
on 
he 
Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) identify trust as a necessary condition for collective action, in 
e bound to trust the contributions of others if they are 
s themselves. It does not seem to be differences in 
general trust levels between villages, which support the previously mentioned argument; the 
igher trust level between 
People rarely lend each other money, because they know that there is little chance of getti
it back. However, some women save with ROSCAs (Rotating savings and credit 
associations)22, consisting of 6-15 women using their saved money for small-scale 
businesses on their own. Two of the ROSCAs we found had already closed down
activities, in one case because the participants were not able to pay their turns, in another 
case because someone suspected that others would not be able to pay at their next turn, 
hence they pulled out in advance.  
I did not find any differences between villages in level of self-organised co-operation. The 
higher level of co-operation in V1 than in the other villages hence only refers to co-operati
on village and group village level. It implies that people in V1 have positive previous 
experiences with village co-operation, but not necessarily with co-operation person-to-
person. The forest project was a co-operation project on village level, as it included a high 
share of the village population, and hence it was probably experiences with village level co-
operation that induced expectations about others’ behaviour in the forest project. In V1, t
high share of norm believers induced expectations about a high share of co-operators also in 
the forest project. In the other villages, a low share of norm believers induced the opposite 
expectations about others’ behaviour. 
4.4.4 Trust 
addition to good leadership. People ar
to contribute in collective action problem
higher share of norm believers in V1 is not a result of a generally h
                                              
22 ROSCA is a group of individuals meeting regularly to save money together. Each time all members 
contribute the same amount, while only one of them receive the sum. The members rotate on being the 
receiver. ROSCA can be used to save money, in lack of a proper banking system, and works as investment 
credits for small-scale businesses.  
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individuals, but rather a result of more trust in people’s contributions to village level 
projects. 
Asking respondents directly about trust gave few valuable answers. It is a sensible issue, 
which demands a lot of trust also in the interviewer. However, respondents did often not 
seem to mean the same thing with trust as I do. Here is an example. I asked two brothers 
aid that this kind of trust 
only meant that they talk with them when they meet occasionally. When I asked if they 
 
e I would lend my business to is my brother.” For these guys, trust 
hence seems to be more like an expression of liking people personally and interacting nicely 
ng 
st 
ed 
 
that everybody else in the village contributes to public works, an indication of trust towards 
each other of co-operating. An important reason behind this trust is however the enforcement 
who they trusted in the area (they both spoke English, so this time I was able to 
communicate without my translator). They said they trusted everybody, even people from 
village 4, “…although these people are all thieves”. Later, they s
would be willing to let these people sell their food at the market for them and trust them to 
bring back the right amount, the answer was abrupt: “No, no, then they would probably take 
the profits and tell me they only got to sell at the lowest price. That would be the same as 
leaving your house with the door open, and tell your neighbour to watch it. It would be like 
an invitation to rob you! I would never do that. We always lock the house with a key when
we go away. The only on
with them, more than expecting a non-selfish behaviour when not seen by others. Other 
experiences indicated the same. Many respondents seemed to take trust as a degree of liki
and chatting with the person, but nothing more. I interpret this as a sign of low general tru
among people. Higher trust levels between individuals in these villages might have increas
people’s expectations about co-operative behaviour of others in the forest project, which 
would have increased individual incentives for co-operation.  
4.5 Co-operation norm 
4.5.1 How leadership and trust shape the norm 
Krishna (2001) emphasises that existing levels of social capital needs to be drawn upon by 
capable agency, for example leaders, in order to reach collective action. The analysed 
villages differ when it comes to contribution to public works. Respondents in village 1 claim
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of their village leader. People who do not show up to public works are always dragged in 
afterwards by the village leader and forced to do their parts of the work, or even more. In 
other villages, contributions to public works are less. Defectors are faced with threats of 
receiving fertilizer coupons and other types of development help. How real this threat 
depends on their relation with the chief. 
not 
is 
“If one does not participate in such works (public works in the village) you become the 
ee 
for help that comes from 
n trust, 
enemy of the village leader and you are not involved in the list of those receiving handouts 
especially the coupons for subsidized fertilizer.” (Woman, V2)  
People are either well connected with the chief or not. If you for some kind of reason do not 
receive handouts from the chief, you don’t face any extra sanctions if you skip contributing 
to public works, as this woman in V9 puts it: 
“I have never moulded bricks for the nursery school. It is deliberately, I don’t want to. I s
no reason of contributing to these things when I never get listed 
outside.” (Woman, V9) 
Why does village 1 have higher co-operation levels than the other villages? Their strong 
leader plays an important role, as she is able to convince people that everybody else will 
contribute due to her authority. When people believe that everybody else will contribute, 
they are more willing to co-operate themselves. Is this really co-operation based o
when people are forced through the authority of the leader? It might be a different kind of 
trust, but the result is however the same. Nobody skips contributing to village projects in V1, 
because they trust that they will not end up as suckers. Everybody knows that everybody else 
generally co-operates in village projects, and this seem to have induced a high share of co-
operators also in the forest project. This certainty of others’ contribution is a mutual trust, 
although it is an enforced trust. Trust must develop from some kind of positive experiences, 
and whether these experiences are enforced from outside does not make a difference to the 
way they work. But notice that this trust only works on the specific issues on which it is 
enforced, which is contribution in common village projects. People only trust each other to 
co-operate in such specific projects, and it does not necessarily mean that they trust each 
other also in other regards.  
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Is it the intertwined variables of strong leadership and social capital (used as a more general
term for trust and trustworthiness) which have induced the strong norm of co-operation in 
public projects in V1. A powerful leader has cont
 
ributed to encourage existing levels of 
social capital by inducing co-operational experiences. From increased co-operational 
n 
“I don’t know how much to trust them. In a current project of building contour ridges, all 
people have until now worked together in building ridges for different gardens. We have 
as helped. We have not yet come to my 
s. 
y all 
again 
age 5 is also an example of 
 
because of its high co-operative levels. 
experiences, the norm of co-operation has strengthened, and stands on its own without 
threats of sanctions from the VL. 
The other example of high co-operative levels was found in V5. An outside positive shift i
the power of the leader occurred when village leaders were given the task of distributing 
fertilizer coupons, which made his villagers more obedient towards him. They started co-
operating on public village projects when the chief asked them. With such positive 
experiences of co-operation, they are in the process of building social capital. The new trust 
developed among villagers, however, is not fully established yet, but is probably in a 
constant move depending on their mutual behaviour. A man in this village answered this 
when he was asked whether he trusted the people in his village: 
built ridges in one garden at a time, and everybody h
gardens, that is why I can’t yet say that I trust the others. If they all also help when they 
come to my garden, I will be able to say that I trust them very much.” (Man, V5) 
His trust is thus not yet fully established, it depends on the behaviour of the other villager
He has probably not yet experienced enough projects with full co-operation to tell if the
will co-operate. But he himself has contributed up to now, and the same have all others. If 
they all continue to contribute when their own gardens are done, it will be taken as a sign of 
trustworthiness and they will earn trust for future use. This is an example of how social 
capital is built and how it is used in the villages. It shows how outside forces, here 
increased power of the leader, can give a push to social capital, which gives positive 
externalities as to co-operation and trust among villagers. Vill
how outside organisations can help increase social capital in Malawian villages by 
introducing development projects which depend on co-operation by villagers. Several 
respondents in village 5 claimed that their village was picked out for development projects
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“People in V4, V6 and V7 don’t listen to their chiefs. That is why you see that there are no
development
 
 projects there, as it is here. For example the project of contour ridges couldn’t 
have happened in those villages.” (Woman, V5) 
ed 
equipment and materials for building the ridges and taught villagers how to 
build such ridges. But the job had to be done by the villagers themselves. V5 got this one 
 
of co-operation has been established. 
4.5.2 What is the social disapproval? 
e others. For a social norm to be a 
factor in the decision making for the individual, it has to induce some kind of unpleasantness 
According to how people define bad behaviour, mountainside farmers who were defecting 
while others were co-operating in the forest project, should be considered to be bad behaved 
The project referred to by the respondent above, a project of building contour ridges in all 
gardens within the village, was introduced by an NGO coming from outside. They offer
the necessary 
chance of developing their village, and they all knew that they would be unlikely to receive 
similar help again if the project failed. Incentives for co-operation were high. As it seems 
like the co-operation in the project is successful, this experience contribute to build social 
capital which will be useful in the future. Villagers will remember that everyone contributed 
the last time and expect a high share of co-operators also in the next collective action 
problem. Therefore, if a similar forest project would be introduced in V5 again, it is more 
likely that it would be successful. As co-operation becomes a habit, one can say that a norm
The norm of co-operation stands stronger in V1 than in th
to norm breakers. How are norm breakers punished socially? When villagers were asked 
about whether defectors are punished socially in addition to penalties from the leaders, 
nobody admitted to impose any such social sanctions. However, when asked about which 
people they trust in the village, most state that they trust people according to their behaviour. 
There are always some people in each village who behave badly, and these people are not to 
be trusted. Bad behaviour refers to gossiping, talking badly about others, or being 
disrespectful towards leaders and others. The main social sanction on bad behaved people 
seem to be decreased trust from others, or loss of reputation. 
by norm-believers. A woman from V1, who cultivated in the mountainside but stopped at 
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once the project was introduced, tells that someone else has now started cultivating in her 
old garden: 
“The trees (in my old garden) have now been cut down, I don’t know by whom, and now a 
woman from Village 1 is cultivating at that plot. People have different behaviour. I could not 
do anything about it, I had lost the rights to that plot after I stopped cultivating.” (Old 
woman, V1) 
This old woman says she does not react to the other woman who has started cultivating in 
her old mountainside garden, because the garden is not hers anymore. But, she states that the 
nt behaviour than herself and others in the village, and hence marks a 
distance between them. This distance is what I refer to as the social disapproval. The 
t and 
 
es 
holdings differed between farmers within each village, more than it differed between 
woman has a differe
cultivating woman probably feels this social distance. The two women might interac
talk normally when they meet, but they both know that the cultivating woman has left the 
other woman being a sucker in the collective action game. 
4.6 Land dependence 
4.6.1 Individual alternative land holdings 
Land scarcity is the main reason behind deforestation of the research mountain and 
correspondingly also makes reforestation very difficult. Mountainside farmers with little
alternative holdings of land should be more prone to defection to the forest project than 
others with additional large land areas in the valley. Is there a difference between villag
when it comes to alternative land holdings for mountainside farmers? Not according to my 
interviews. All interviewed mountainside farmer23 were asked about their land holdings, 
annual harvest, use of production inputs and general wealth. Nearly all of them were very 
dependent on their mountainside land, no matter which village they lived in. Alternative land 
                                              
23 I interviewed 26 mountainside farmers from different villages, mostly from V1, V4, V5 and V9. The focus 
on these four villages was due to their distinct forest outcome in both ends of the scale, village 1 and 9 
currently with thick forest and village 4 and 5 without trees. 
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villages. Respondents with very little land exist in all villages, no more in some than others
My impression is thus that alternative land holdings among mountainside farmers were 
equally distributed between villages. However, alternative land holdings differed among 
mountainside farmers within each village. A very few had enough alternative land, a few ha
almost no alternative opportunities, while most had a little alternative land. Thus, my 
impression is that the assumption made in the theoretical model in chapter 3.3.3 about a bell
shaped distribution of land dependency among mountainside farmers within a village, seem 
to hold.  
. 
d 
 
4.6.2 Wealth 
h 
ore 
usinesses 
ible 
g 
r 
 
The wealth variable needs to be discussed, as it might have significant influence on 
mountainside farmers’ land dependency. General wealth of individual households differs 
within villages, and the distribution does also to some extent differ between villages.  Richer 
households in this case are households who are able to have other sources of income in 
addition to farming. Overall, some households in V4 seem slightly richer than the general 
level in other villages. V4 has got more houses built with iron sheets and burnt bricks, whic
are good indications of wealth24. This impression is supported with my impression that m
men within this village are formally employed and more of the women do private b
in town. However, among the mountainside farmers interviewed, most were just as poor as 
people in other villages, thus they probably were just as dependent on the mountainside land 
as people in other villages. The other villages seem relatively similar when it comes to 
quality houses and general wealth. There are differences within the villages, but not any 
considerable differences between them. Hence, I have no indication that differences in 
wealth levels have directly affected the outcome of the forest project. However, one poss
implication of the relative wealth in village 4 is that the villagers are less dependent on bein
on good terms with their village leader, because they do not depend on receiving fertilize
coupons and other benefits distributed by her. Hence, this might be one of the reasons for the
                                              
24 Laying the roof of the house with iron sheets instead of thatched grass is expensive, but very valuable, as 
iron sheets works much better in holding rains out and does not need to be changed every year as grass do. 
Burnt bricks are as well costly, because the burning process demands a lot of expensive firewood. These two 
properties of a house are often referred to as wealth indicators in the villages. People seem very keen on getting 
a quality house, probably as it also works as a symbol of status. If they get in hold of more money, many state 
that the first thing they would do is to upgrade their main house.  
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low willingness to co-operate in this village. As their wealth derives from income earning 
activities which take time, they might just not have time to contribute to public works in the 
farmer in V4, a strong single mother who 
e woman who stated that she does 
t 
s 
 
 in V4 
 
re 
mountainside land relatively to valley land. Thus, the share of mountainside farmers in these 
. The share of mountainside farmers in one village might have 
affected the forest outcome, through the legitimacy of the project. In a village in which 50 % 
village. The wealthiest interviewed mountainside 
earns money on trading clothes in townships, is the sam
not listen to the chief (see quotation in chapter 4.2.2 under V4). She goes to town to do 
business nearly every day and do not contribute to public works. On the other hand, one of 
the poorer respondents claimed she obeys the chief and contributes to public works, but tha
many others in the village do not. My data is however not sufficiently large to claim that thi
relation between wealth and obedience is a pattern. 
4.6.3 Share of mountainside farmers 
The main difference between villages regarding land holdings is the relative share of land in
the mountainside versus land in the valley. Briefly estimated, every second household
and V5 have gardens in the mountainside. Finding mountainside farmers to interview in 
these villages was hence an easy task, in contrast to V1, V2 and V3, in which the shares of
people previously holding gardens in the mountainside were much lower. Several sources 
have stated that V4, V5, V8 and V9 were more dependent on the mountainside land for 
cultivation than were the other villages, because the village area consists of mo
villages is accordingly higher
of the population is negatively affected by the forest project, there are as many net losers as 
there are winners, hence the total efficiency of the project is less than in a village in which 
only 10 % is negatively affected. The villages with a higher total share of mountainside 
farmers also have relatively less land in the valley, which means that the prevention of soil 
erosion in the valley would not benefit inhabitants of the village to the same extent as in 
other villages. Lower total efficiency of the forest project in the villages with a higher share 
of mountainside farmers, might have decreased the legitimacy of the project and hence 
induced low expectations about initial co-operation. 
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4.7 Other possible factors 
4.7.1 Group size and resource size 
When the number of participants in collective action is large, the typical participant will 
e 
 is the larger sized villages which have reached a successful 
outcome in collective action, hence the hypothesis above does not hold. This is because the 
ave less land than the larger villages. Number of 
25. These smaller villages have a larger 
d, 
A 
t 
an on 
ade 
 
o 
ide. 
know that his own contribution will probably not make much difference to the outcome and 
he will not bother to contribute (Olson, 1965). According to an enormous literature on the 
issue, smaller groups are hence more likely to engage in successful collective action on th
commons, although the mechanisms are still under discussion (Agrawal, 2002).  
Villages 1, 7, 8 and 9 are the largest villages in terms of inhabitants, while villages 4, 5 and 6 
are the smallest. In this case it
villages with few inhabitants also h
inhabitants is quite closely related to size of land area
share of their total land in the mountainside, naturally because they have less valley lan
which is to say that they have a higher share of mountainside farmers within each village. 
higher share of mountainside farmers within the village seems to have had a negative effec
on collective action in the forest project, as already discussed in chapter 4.6.3. 
4.7.2 Infrastructure 
The infrastructure on the south side of the mountain is considerably more developed th
the north side, which can be seen on the map in figure 4-1. This difference might have m
it easier for agents outside the communities to control the project on the south side than on
the north side. However, only two such agents are relevant; the MoP, Mbewe, who often 
visited a village in group A south of the mountain and whose visits thus had nothing to d
with infrastructure, and the district forest minister, who visited the mountain only once and 
saw both sides, but did not enforce any reactions to the deforested villages on the north s
The only effect of this difference on the forest project outcome, which I can think of, is the 
                                              
25 This is logical, because of the way land initially has been allocated in these villages. Newcomers have been 
given the land they needed, as long as there was land left. Each household needs a similar area of land for 
cultivation, hence the population density should be similar in all villages. 
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negative effect of infrastructure on poverty, for example through employment possibilities. 
Wealth as an explanatory factor in the forest outcome is already discussed in chapter 4.6.2.  
4.7.3 Relative prices 
There is no considerable difference in relative prices of goods between the villages, as they 
to a large extent use the same markets and the prices are similar at these. This also holds for 
firewood and timber. All goods relevant to these villagers are cheaper in the countryside 
than in the city, hence location closer to the city does not make any difference in access to 
goods. As to the prices of land, it is not allowed to sell land and rental markets are also 
limited. However, land scarcity seems to be similarly problematic in the villages, in terms of 
land holdings per household. 
4.7.4 Biological factors 
Many respondents in village 4, and to some extent also in village 5, blamed biological 
factors for the lost forest on the north side of the mountain. They claimed that the soil on 
their side of the mountain was less fertile than on the south side, and hence the trees died. 
Others claimed that termites ate the trees in their gardens. I do not reckon these explanations 
as relevant, on the background of information obtained from other respondents. Blue gum 
trees are chosen for reforestation projects on mountains in the whole of Chiradzulu district, 
because of its properties as a fast growing and resistant specie, according to the District 
Forest Director. The forest committee headman claimed that blue gum trees can grow 
everywhere, if there is only a thin layer of soil. If the mountainside is fertile enough for 
foodcrops to grow, it is thus unlikely that blue gum trees cannot. In addition, the trees did 
mature to some extent before they disappeared, hence soil fertility in unlikely to be a main 
explanation for their disappearance. Then to the termites; the two sides of the mountain 
seems equal in terms of soil quality, hence I find it hard to believe that termites should have 
destroyed the trees only on the north side and not on the south side. However, the main 
reason why I do not believe biological factors can explain the different outcome, is that all 
respondents from neighbouring villages, and also some people from the northern villages, 
claim that it is the people on the north side themselves who have cut the trees in order to 
continue cultivation. My respondents from all neighbouring villages explain the different 
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outcome with the low co-operative and individualistic behaviour from people in the northern 
villages. 
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5. Conclusion 
It is possible for rural communities to manage their common pool resources. In one village 
analysed in this paper, successful collective action was due to initial endowments of good 
leadership and social capital, which together induced a norm of co-operative behaviour on 
village level. When governments or NGOs want to introduce similar projects to rural 
communities, they might benefit from evaluating these variables in advance. The success of 
previous collective action projects indicates co-operative abilities and increased probability 
of success also in the future. At the same time, communities with low levels of co-operation 
can build such abilities through positive experiences. I therefore argue that there is a role for 
community based development, as a focus on local management and responsibility has the 
possibility for building social capital by introducing and supporting community co-operative 
projects.  
Another of the analysed villages reached the same successful outcome in the forest project, 
mainly because a forest committee was able to enforce heavy penalties on non-co-operators. 
Given the leaders and the level of social capital in community, the presentation and 
implementation of such projects to the people who are directly affected by them, stand out as 
important. Correct information, a decision process including all the people affected and wide 
distribution of benefits increase the probability of a co-operative solution. Outside initiators 
are able to influence these factors, even if the project governance is left fully with the local 
community. In the forest project studied here, the governmental initiators did not intervene 
in any of management decisions regarding the project. Some suggestions and guidance on 
how to solve the conflicts could have been valuable. As MASAF contributed with the 
financing of the project, they could for example have suggested some sort of compensation 
for the mountainside farmers who lost their land. This might have brought a better outcome 
for all villages and decreased conflicts. Community based management can have good 
effects in terms of building social capital locally, but it might benefit from receiving some 
proper guidance from more experienced agents on project management. 
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Appendix 
43BList of respondents 
(Approximated age in parenthesis) 
52BMountainside farmers 
Village 1: Woman (30), woman (65), woman (30), woman (30), woman (20), man (50), 
woman (30). Village 2: Woman (30). Village 3: Man (40), Woman (50). Village 4: Woman 
(50), woman (50), woman (40), woman (60), man (30), woman (50), couple (50). Village 5: 
Woman (30), woman (30), woman (35), man (25), man (40). Village 9: Woman (35), woman 
(65), woman (60), woman (40). Other villages: Man (50), man (55). 
53BKey informants 
Group A: GVL A / VL1; CBO-director; Forest committee headman. Group B: GVL B / 
VL2; daughters of GVL B; VL, other village; VL3; two brothers, other village; woman V3 
(30); man V3 (25); village chairman V3; VL5. Group C: VL9; village chairman V9; CBO-
secretary V8. Other key informants: Former MoP Patrick Mbewe; Forest Director and 
Assistant Forest Director, Chiradzulu District; Oxfam representatives; priests and munks at 
the Catholic Mission. 
54BOthers 
Group A: Man (20); VL (other village); VL (other village); VL (other village). Group B: 
Woman V2 (25); woman V2 (20); woman V2 (50); woman V2 (30); young girls V3; man 
V4 (35); man V4 (40); woman V4 (40); couple V4 (35); man V4 (30); woman V4 (20); 
woman V4 (30); man V4 (25); young guys V5; sister of VL5; girl V5 (15); woman V5 (25); 
guy V5 (20). 
 
 
 
 
